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ABSTRACT
Reporting going concern uncertainty has always been a controversial 
issue for standard-setters, auditors, and users of the financial statements. 
Current standards require the auditor to include an explanatory paragraph in 
an unqualified audit opinion to report going concern uncertainty. This research 
investigated the information content attributed to this additional paragraph as 
viewed by users.
Two groups of commercial loan officers were presented with the same 
information for an actual case company exhibiting going concern uncertainty. 
One group received a modified report and a footnote disclosure of the going 
concern situation while the other group received an unqualified report and the 
footnote disclosure. Both groups were asked to indicate the likelihood that a 
line of credit would be granted to this company, provide an estimate of the 
interest rate, indicate their confidence in their decision, and indicate their 
perception of this company’s potential bankruptcy. A seven-point Likert scale 
was used.
Parametric and nonparametric tests were applied to the data. The 
results did not find both groups’ answers on any of the Likert scales or the 
interest rate estimate to be statistically different based on a modified report
iii
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and a footnote disclosure compared to an unqualified report and a footnote 
disclosure. This study, therefore, showed that the explanatory paragraph for 
going concern uncertainty did not have information content. With the 
elimination of the explanatory paragraph requirement for other uncertainties, 
serious consideration should be given to eliminating this requirement for going 
concern uncertainty as well.
iv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Financial statements of business enterprises must conform with 
prescribed standards known as Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP). GAAP consists of certain rules and assumptions. One important 
assumption--that of the going concem -has received considerable attention and 
caused much controversy in recent years. Under this assumption, a business 
enterprise will continue indefinitely, or at least long enough to fulfill its 
objectives. A violation of this assumption can have a serious impact on 
financial statements. For example, it justifies the depreciation of long-term 
assets. Disregard for this assumption would justify charging assets as expenses 
in the period acquired. The going concern assumption also justifies the 
classification of some assets and liabilities as long-term. Without the enterprise 
continuity assumption, the liquidation basis of accounting would be appropriate.
In addition to its importance in the formulation of GAAP, the going 
concern assumption bears crucially on audits. The auditor issues an opinion 
stating that the financial statements are "in conformity with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles." If preparers have not followed GAAP, the auditor must 
issue a qualified or adverse opinion. Therefore, the auditing profession has
1
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focused its attention on the going concern issue. Past discussions of the going 
concern concept and the resulting standards have had two major objectives. 
They have sought to establish guidelines for the auditor in determining 
compliance with (or departure from) the going concern assumption, and they 
have attempted to determine the best way for communicating non-compliance 
information to users.
Importance of Studying the 
Going Concern Issue
The going concern issue affects several parties: the companies, 
auditor(s), and users of the financial statements. Companies care about their 
financial health and their continuity, as well as their image in the industry and 
the potential negative impact of a deteriorating financial situation. Auditors 
have responsibilities to users who rely upon their reports. Users should only 
depend upon auditors to assure them that financial statements have been 
prepared in accordance with GAAP.
Users of the financial statements, especially investors and creditors, have 
critical interests in each company’s viability for investment. The going concern 
assumption underlies the calculation of the required rate of return on 
investment during a particular period of time. Creditors, such as bankers, also 
have an interest in the company’s continuity and its ability to repay loans and 
interest. Even though creditors have a priority in case of bankruptcy, they must 
consider the opportunity cost of making a loan to another company. Therefore,
A
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during the audit, the auditor must consider the going concern issue and its 
possible implications on all parties involved.
Need for Additional Research 
on Going Concern
In 1988, the Auditing Standards Board (ASB) issued Statement of 
Auditing Standards (SAS) No. 59: "The Auditor’s Consideration of an Entity’s 
Ability to Continue as a Going Concern." The ASB’s chairman described this 
standard as "the most controversial of the numerous projects on which the ASB 
worked during 1986 to 1988" (Guy and Sullivan 1988, 43). The controversy 
arose because many companies had experienced bankruptcy shortly after 
receiving an unqualified opinion from their auditors. This created an 
expectation gap between users and auditors.
In an effort to address the expectation gap, SAS No. 59 required 
auditors to specifically consider the going concern issue in every audit. This 
standard imposed substantially more responsibility on the auditors than had its 
predecessor, SAS No. 34: "The Auditor’s Considerations When a Question 
Arises about an Entity’s Continued Existence." That standard had required 
auditors to consider going concern uncertainty only if they discovered contrary 
information during audits. In those cases, they would issue "subject to" 
qualified opinions. SAS No. 59 provided for the issuance of unqualified 
opinions, but still required that the auditor’s report contain an explanatory 
paragraph describing the going concern doubt.
j
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Substantially less research has examined the explanatory paragraph 
requirement than the "subject to" requirement. This lack of research has 
continued even though explanatory paragraphs arguably have retained certain 
"red flag" features (Kaplan and Pany 1992). In their study of comment letters 
on SAS No. 59’s exposure draft, Kaplan and Pany found considerable user 
support for this standard. However, responses indicated a difference of opinion 
among "Big Six" firms as well as among smaller firms.
Empirical evidence concerning the frequency of issuing going concern 
opinions after SAS No. 59 showed the need for additional study. According to 
Carsello, Hermanson, and Huss (1995), auditors did not tend to issue going 
concern modified reports after SAS No. 59 became effective. On the other 
hand, Raghunandan and Rama (1995) provided different results showing 
auditors issuing more modified reports after SAS No. 59 took effect. These 
conflicting results showed the need for additional study of the impact of SAS 
No. 59 on interested parties.
Timing has also added importance to this study. During 1988, the ASB 
issued SAS No. 58: "Reports on Audited Financial Statements." This standard 
required each auditor to modify his report using an explanatory paragraph 
highlighting any uncertainties (other than going concern) facing the company. 
However, in December 1995, SAS No. 79 amended SAS No. 58, and it 
eliminated the explanatory paragraph requirement. SAS No. 79, however, did 
not amend SAS No. 59 regarding the use of an explanatory paragraph for a
i
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going concern issue. The issuance of a special standard dealing with going 
concern uncertainty, as well as the refusal to change it later, indicated the 
importance of this problem and the method of reporting it.
Purpose of the Study
The primary purpose of this study has been to examine the usefulness of 
the explanatory paragraph concerning going concern uncertainty to users of the 
financial statements. The elimination of explanatory paragraphs for other 
uncertainties has created the need for a prescriptive study to determine the 
appropriate treatment of explanatory paragraphs for going concern 
uncertainties. This project selected financial statement users for its study 
group; the ASB had targeted them in its standard-setting process, and they had 
provided the most input to SAS No. 59’s exposure draft.
Secondary objectives included gaining insight into users’ reaction to 
financial statements of companies exhibiting going concern problems. The 
study also examined the impact of the explanatory paragraph on users’ 
confidence and whether such a paragraph increased the perception of 
bankruptcy.
Statement of the Problem
The APB has mandated use of an explanatory paragraph (when 
applicable) for going concern uncertainty in audit reports. However, the 
accounting profession has not yet developed a consensus about the information
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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content of the explanatory paragraph. This study has addressed the problem of 
determining the information content of the explanatory paragraph. In 
particular, it has attempted to determine whether the explanatory paragraph 
has provided user information in addition to that not conveyed through 
footnote disclosures. This study has also sought to measure the "side effects" of 
the modified report on the lending decision, and it has attempted to determine 
whether going concern disclosures increased the perception of bankruptcy.
Research Design
In the interest of realism, the experiment for this study used Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Form 10-K report data from a company that 
actually received a going concern modified report.
Data and Sample Selection
The participant sample for this experiment consisted of loan officers in 
different banks across the United States. Those bankers had experience in 
reviewing loan applications from businesses similar to the company selected.
The study utilized a mail questionnaire.
The Experiment
Data for this study included a selected company’s financial statements, 
as well as the audit report and the footnote explaining going concern 
uncertainty. The participant sample was divided into two groups. The first 
group evaluated an unqualified audit report with the explanatory paragraph
il
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(i.e., a "modified" report), as well as the footnote; the other group evaluated an 
unqualified audit report with no explanatory paragraph, as well as the footnote.
Each participant was asked to estimate the likelihood that his bank 
would grant a specified line of credit, as well as what interest rate the bank 
would charge. The study attributed risk perception differences—between 
groups, but for the same company~to the information content of the 
explanatory paragraph.
Expected Contribution of the Study
This study has investigated some possible effects of eliminating the 
explanatory paragraph requirement for reporting going concern uncertainty.
For other uncertainties, the APB had reasoned that footnote disclosures 
provided a sufficient explanation that made the explanatory paragraph 
unnecessary. This prescriptive research should shed light on the usefullness of 
an explanatory paragraph regarding going concern uncertainties by focusing on 
an important segment of audit report users. Also, it should shed light on 
bankers’ perception of going concern uncertainty.
Dissertation Outline
Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents a literature review 
detailing the profession’s struggle with the going concern problem and the 
appropriate method for reporting it. It reviews several studies explaining the 
consequences of going concern warnings, as well as studies of capital markets
i
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and studies investigating the information content of these warnings. Chapter 3 
describes the research methodology, sample selection, and data gathering 
techniques employed in this study. Chapter 4 presents analyses of the data 
obtained from the experiment. Chapter 5 discusses the findings and their 
policy implications. The Appendices present the case, the questionnaire and a 
sample of respondents’ comments.
i i
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter presents a review of the auditing profession’s attempt to 
deal with the going concern issue through commissions and standards. It 
initially examines early efforts that dealt with the issue of uncertainties in 
general (such as SAP Nos. 15 and 33 and SAS Nos. 58 and 79), and going 
concern uncertainties in particular (such as SAS Nos. 34 and 59). It then 
reviews empirical studies examining the consequences of qualified opinions on 
companies and auditors. The next section reviews capital market studies 
dealing with the information content of qualified opinions, especially those 
qualified due to uncertainties and going concern issues. That section examines 
studies using pre- and post-SAS No. 59 language. The final part of this chapter 
reviews experimental studies that have examined the information content of 
qualified opinions and reports modified due to uncertainties.
Early Efforts bv the Auditing Profession
Statement on Auditing Procedure (SAP) No. 15 (in 1942) addressed the 
effect of uncertainties in general, including going concern uncertainty, on the 
audit report. The statement suggested that the cumulative effect of
9
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uncertainties could require modification of the standard audit report and could 
make the auditor unable to render an opinion. SAP No. 33 (in 1963) required 
that audit reports modified due to material uncertainties-including going 
concern uncertainty-contain the qualifying words "subject to."
Commission on Auditors’
Responsibilities
The requirement to issue a "subject to" opinion triggered debate and 
controversy on the appropriate way to report uncertainties. In 1974, the 
Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (CAR)-also known as the Cohen 
Commission—was formed to determine the appropriate level of auditors’ 
responsibilities regarding uncertainties. In 1978, the CAR recommended 
elimination of "subject to" opinions. The commission had deemed these 
opinions deficient in several respects. First, the commission believed that SAP 
No. 33 unreasonably required the auditor to serve as a reporter and interpreter 
of financial information when reporting on uncertainties. In addition, the 
auditor was in no better position than users to predict the outcome of the 
uncertainty. Second, the "subject to" opinion may have confused users by 
creating the false impression that preparers would restate the financial 
statements upon resolution of the uncertainty. Third, the commission believed 
that SAP No. 33 may have created false expectations that unqualified opinions 
meant no uncertainties. In the Commission’s view, "All companies, however, 
face a variety of economic risks." Fourth, the requirement to qualify could
i !
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cause the auditor to overlook the appropriateness of the footnote disclosure. 
The CAR recommended that the auditor not attempt to reduce uncertainty by 
predicting the outcome of future events. The Commission acknowledged users’ 
needs for a warning signal, but it noted that users should not view going 
concern qualifications as a prediction of bankruptcy. The CAR also 
acknowledged the "self-fulfilling prophecy" feature of the going concern 
qualification when it noted, "Creditors often regard a ’subject to’ qualification 
as a separate reason for not granting a loan." The CAR concluded overall that 
the auditor should appropriately disclose all uncertainties, including going 
concern issues, in the footnotes.
The Commission’s recommendations regarding uncertainties faced strong 
opposition from users. Several studies sought to determine investors’ and 
bankers’ preference for reporting uncertainties.
Shank, Dillard, and Murdock (1978) presented senior loan officers with 
the option to choose the method through which auditors should communicate 
uncertainty and their perception of the way in which auditors would 
communicate. The options consisted of (1) no reference to the situation,
(2) disclosure only in the unaudited section of the annual report, (3) disclosure 
in a footnote, (4) disclosure plus a "subject to" opinion, and (5) disclaimer of 
opinion. The officers reviewed eight cases involving contingencies, including 
going concern difficulties. Most officers indicated that for all contingencies the 
auditor should issue a qualified opinion. They had an even higher preference
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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for going concern uncertainty. Only 38% correctly predicted how the auditor 
would report the contingency. The bankers also noted that qualified opinions 
provided a better defense for the auditor in case of an unfavorably resolved 
contingency.
In another study, Shank, Dillard, and Bylinski (1979) surveyed investors 
to determine their reporting preferences regarding uncertainties. They 
presented eight cases and gave investors the following options: (1) no specific 
reference to the situation, (2) disclosure only in the unaudited section of the 
annual report, (3) disclosure in a footnote to the financial statements,
(4) disclosure in the footnotes plus a "subject to" audit report, and
(5) disclaimer of opinion. Similar to the bankers’ study, investors expressed 
preference for the "subject to" audit report. Most investors noted that the 
auditor should report contingencies through a qualified opinion and a footnote 
disclosure, especially for going concern problems.
These studies indicated investor and banker opposition to the CAR’s 
recommendation to eliminate the qualified opinion. Bankers argued that 
qualified opinions served useful purpose in decision making. The ASB 
considered the Committee’s recommendation. In fact, the ASB came close to 
implementing it in 1982, with SEC concurrence. However, according to Asare 
(1990), in a public meeting to discuss the exposure draft, users voiced strong 
opposition that lawmakers later supported, and the ASB never implemented 
the standard.
J
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SAS No. 34
In 1981, the ASB issued SAS No. 34 dealing specifically with the going 
concern issue. The standard did not impose a responsibility on auditors to 
evaluate the company’s going concern status unless they discovered contrary 
information during the audit. The auditor’s responsibility did not extend 
beyond the consideration of asset recoverability and liability classification. If 
auditors had doubt about the entity’s continued existence, the new standard 
required that they should consider mitigating factors and the effect of this 
doubt on the financial statements. SAS No. 34 required them to issue a 
qualified "subject to" opinion if they questioned the recoverability of assets and 
classification of liabilities.
The level of responsibility indicated by SAS No. 34 proved inadequate 
for lawmakers and users. They noted that many businesses (such as United 
American Bank and Penn Square Bank) had failed shortly after receiving an 
unqualified audit opinion. Because SAS No. 34 did not fulfill users’ wishes, an 
expectation gap developed.
The Expectation Gap
Practitioners acknowledged an expectation gap but could develop no 
consensus supporting additional auditor responsibilities. Elliott and Jacobson 
(1987) argued that auditors could not provide an effective warning signal for 
bankruptcy because no one could. They argued
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
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The underlying question is not whether auditors should be providing 
early-warning information in audit reports but whether users are receiving 
sufficient audited financial information to assist them in reaching 
conclusions on the future prospects of business entities. (Emphasis 
added)
The authors implied limited auditor responsibility. Auditors should only 
present financial information to permit users to make decisions.
Campbell and Mutchler (1988) compared auditors’ and bankers’ 
perceptions of the going concern audit opinion. Auditors indicated that they 
issued a going concern opinion because of likely failure and that the value of 
the assets reported in the financial statement did not indicate recoverable 
value. Surprisingly, 39% of the auditors indicated the need for a going concern 
opinion in the event of probable failure. Additionally they thought the auditor 
should provide a signal to financial statement users. In interpreting these 
findings, the authors argued that many of the auditors responded with what 
they thought they should do.
Most bankers chose the option that auditors did have the responsibility 
for signaling going concern doubt. Both groups deemed the opinion important 
and useful. The authors concluded that the ASB could eliminate the 
expectation gap with no difficulty. These results prompted the ASB to consider 
issuing a statement that would satisfy users by retaining the early warning signal 
while eliminating the "subject to" qualification.
i i
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SAS No. 58
In 1988, the Accounting Standards Board issued a number of 
"expectation gap standards." SAS No. 58 dealt with uncertainties in general, 
and SAS No. 59 dealt specifically with going concern uncertainty.
SAS No. 58 defined an uncertainty as
A matter . . . that is expected to be resolved at a future date, at which 
time sufficient evidential matter concerning its outcome would be 
expected to become available.
For example, the auditors for a defendant in a lawsuit with an uncertain 
outcome on the balance sheet date would have to consider the adequacy of the 
footnote disclosure regarding this uncertainty. If the auditors considered the 
disclosure inadequate, they would have to add an explanatory paragraph to the 
unqualified opinion emphasizing the uncertainty and referring the user to the 
appropriate footnote. This type of opinion became known as "the modified 
report." The standard did not specify the language of the explanatory 
paragraph. Inadequate footnote disclosures would constitute a departure from 
GAAP, and require a qualified or adverse opinion.
SAS No. 58 effectively eliminated "subject to" opinions and replaced 
them with modified reports that retained the warning signals. It appeared that 
the ASB believed in the CAR’s recommendation that the words "subject to" 
confused users. However, the ASB continued to require early warnings, and it 
shifted its emphasis to how to report uncertainties in the audit report, not
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
whether to report them. The ASB, therefore, partially implemented the Cohen 
Commission’s recommendations.
The ASB felt that uncertainties fell into different categories. One 
category of uncertainties related to litigation and other situations involving 
losses, while a second, more serious, category related to going concern issues. 
The board clarified its apparent classification of uncertainties when it issued a 
special statement dealing with going concern uncertainties.
SAS No. 59
SAS No. 59, issued in 1988 and effective in 1989, substantially changed 
the way auditors considered and reported going concern problems. For 
example, SAS No. 59 specifically required the auditor to consider the going 
concern assumption in every audit. SAS No. 59 focused, not on the 
recoverability of assets or the classification of liabilities, but rather on the going 
concern assumption. SAS No. 59 imposed an affirmative duty on the auditor, 
compared to a negative duty under SAS No. 34. SAS No. 59 offered several 
guidelines for the auditor in dealing with the going concern issue. For 
example, the standard listed negative trends--such as working capital 
deficiencies and negative cash flows--as factors raising substantial doubt about 
the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern. Other factors included 
internal matters (such as work stoppages or labor problems), significant need to 
revise operations, and external matters (such as legislation changes or losses of 
key franchises or patents).
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If the auditor discovered such factors during the audit, it would justify 
doubt about the entity’s going concern assumption. If there were substantial 
doubt about the entity’s ability to continue as a going concern for a  period not 
to exceed one year from the date of the financial statements, the auditor would 
have to consider management’s plans to mitigate the problem. Management’s 
plans may include disposition of assets, additional borrowing, and/or 
restructuring. In considering management’s plans, the auditor would have to 
consider positive and negative factors in the implementation of these plans. 
Adequate management plans, along with complete disclosures, would make 
report modification unnecessary.
If, after reviewing management plans, there were still substantial doubt, 
the auditor would have to consider the completeness of the disclosures and 
could issue a modified report. That report would contain an explanatory 
paragraph, and an unqualified opinion, if appropriate. Incomplete and 
insufficient disclosures would constitute a departure from GAAP, and the 
auditor would issue a qualified or adverse opinion. The ASB left most of the 
language of the explanatory paragraph to the auditor’s discretion. The ASB 
required that the auditor would mention the condition(s) giving rise to 
substantial doubt and would refer the reader to the appropriate footnote. The 
standard also required the use of the phrase "substantial doubt about its (the 
entity’s) ability to continue as a going concern."
i
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SAS No. 59, however, allowed the auditor to issue either a modified 
report or a disclaimer of opinion. The standard did not provide the auditor 
with specific guidance in choosing the type of report. LaSalle, Anandarajan 
and Miller (1996) examined some of the factors that influenced the auditor in 
determining the type of report to issue. They surveyed 183 partners in CPA 
firms. Modified reports were sent to 130 partners and disclaimers of opinion 
were sent to 53 partners. The questions presented the partners with 51 items 
representing good news and bad news about a company and potential legal 
liability. The respondents were asked to assess the extent to which each factor 
was present in a client of their choice that received a going concern report.
This survey, therefore, provided confidential information about 183 companies 
experiencing going concern difficulty. The respondents’ perception of the 
importance of each factor in deciding which report to issue was measured on a 
1 to 5 scale. The results showed that companies that received a disclaimer of 
opinion were more likely to have more bad news items, fewer good news items 
and weaker internal control. The results also showed that auditors who 
believed the going concern audit report offered protection from lawsuits were 
more likely to issue a disclaimer of opinion if the probability of a lawsuit was 
high.
In an attempt to analyze SAS No. 59, Ellingsen, Pany, and Fagan (1989) 
noted that although the standard required the auditors to evaluate going 
concern, they had no responsibility for predicting future events. They
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compared an audit to an annual physical examination, whereby the doctor dealt 
with existing conditions as of the date of the examination and not with 
subsequent conditions. The doctor in this case had no responsibility for future 
events, and the patient could not hold the doctor accountable for such events.
In issuing SAS No. 59, the ASB implemented some of the CAR’s 
recommendation. The ASB considered "subject to" opinions misleading and 
eliminated them. On the other hand, the board did not believe the CAR’s 
recommendation that auditors could not assess viability as a going concern. 
Therefore, it retained the warning signal previously conveyed by "subject to" 
opinions by adding the explanatory paragraph. The standard focused on how to 
communicate going concern uncertainties, not on whether to communicate 
them.
The issuance of SAS Nos. 58 and 59 was an attempt to close the 
expectation gap by requiring auditors to communicate uncertainties to users to 
help them in their decision making. However, the question of report 
redundancy resurfaced during attempts to measure appropriate ways of 
communicating these uncertainties.
SAS No. 79
In December 1995, the ASB issued SAS No. 79: "Amendment to 
Statement on Auditing Standards No. 58, ’Reports on Audited Financial 
Statements.’" SAS No. 79 no longer required the auditor to use an explanatory 
paragraph to report certain uncertainties. Under the new standard, auditors
J
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had the option of including an explanatory paragraph if they desired to do so. 
However, SAS No. 79 did not affect going concern reporting. It still required 
an explanatory paragraph for going concern uncertainties.
Birdzell (1996) analyzed the reasons for amending SAS No. 58. He 
noted that many users believed that the uncertainties paragraph communicated 
information not disclosed in the footnotes. Contrary to the ASB’s intention, 
some users viewed the absence of the explanatory paragraph as indicating no 
uncertainties, and this impression discouraged them from reading the footnotes. 
The standards board noted that users required explanatory paragraphs based 
on concerns about the adequacy of footnote disclosures. Statement of Position 
(SOP) 94-6: "Disclosure of Certain Significant Risks and Uncertainties" 
required additional disclosures in the footnotes. This addressed users’ concerns 
about disclosure adequacy, and it rendered the explanatory paragraph no 
longer necessary.
By issuing SAS No. 79, the ASB implemented another recommendation 
of the CAR. The board believed that explanatory paragraphs, for most 
uncertainties, contained no information beyond that in the footnotes, and that 
auditors should avoid them. The board, however, did not hold the same belief 
for going concern uncertainties.
Consequences of Qualified Opinions
Several studies have investigated the different consequences of qualified 
reports, especially those qualified or modified for uncertainties. The decision
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to issue a qualified opinion certainly involved extensive discussion between the 
auditors and the company due to the potential signaling effect of this opinion. 
Such signaling may have induced auditor switching and the potential self- 
fulfilling prophecy effect. From the auditors’ perspective, qualified opinions 
may have provided liability protection in case of a lawsuit. This section reviews 
related research in this area.
Auditor Changes
Chow and Rice (1982) provided early evidence that companies tended to 
switch auditors after receiving qualified opinions. They examined a total of 
10,000 firms for the years 1973 and 1974. They classified firms into four 
categories: (1) those companies changing auditors after receiving a qualified 
opinion, (2) those companies keeping the same auditors after receiving a 
qualified opinion, (3) those companies changing auditors after receiving a clean 
opinion, and (4) those keeping the same auditors after receiving a clean 
opinion. Comparison tests indicated that companies tended to change auditors 
more frequently after receiving a qualified opinion. This result remained true 
after controlling for other factors leading to auditor changes. The authors also 
found that auditors differed in their tendency to issue qualified opinions.
In a similar study, Schwartz and Menon (1985) found no evidence of 
auditor switching. They examined a sample of only 131 failed firms, but they 
tested a larger time frame, from 1974 to 1982. They selected a control group 
by matching every bankrupt company with a non-bankrupt company in the
il
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same industry. The study classified distressed companies that made auditor 
changes in the three-year period before bankruptcy as "switchers" and those 
that did not switch during the same period as "non-switchers." Comparison tests 
indicated no evidence of auditor switching after receiving qualified opinions.
Craswell (1988) examined the issue of qualified opinions and auditor 
switching in Australia. He reviewed about 33,000 annual reports of companies 
listed on the Sydney Stock Exchange from 1950 to 1979. Craswell considered 
only first-time qualifications, and he identified changes of auditors as those 
occurring any time within five years after the qualification. This time frame 
was differed from the one-year time frames used by Chow and Rice (1982) and 
Schwartz and Menon (1985). Craswell established two qualification 
classifications. "Serious" qualifications consisted of disclaimers, adverse 
opinions, and multiple reasons for qualification. "Minor" qualifications 
concerned technical accounting differences. His results indicated that 
companies tended to change auditors more frequently after receiving 
qualifications, especially "serious" qualifications.
The previous studies provided mixed results. However, use of different 
methodologies preclude direct comparisons of results. For example, the time 
frame used by Chow and Rice (1982) and Schwartz and Menon (1985) differed 
from the one used by Craswell (1988). Difficulties arose in attempts to 
compare Chow and Rice (1982) with Schwartz and Menon (1985) because the 
latter study used only failed firms and a different time period. In addition,
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Craswell examined only Australian firms. Therefore, the evidence on auditor 
switching after qualified opinions is inconclusive.
Company Failures
Williams (1984) interviewed 15 partners in large accounting firms about 
their impressions of the going concern opinion and its consequences. The 
partners indicated that they considered several factors when issuing a going 
concern opinion. The interviewers also sought opinions about the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of the going concern opinion. This prophecy stipulates that if the 
audit report refers to the going concern uncertainty, this referral, by itself, 
rather than the company’s actual condition will cause the company to fail. The 
partners had different opinions about the self-fulfilling prophecy, but most of 
them said it did not affect their decision. Those partners rejecting the self- 
fulfilling prophecy noted that investors had enough sophistication to rely on 
additional sources.
Garsombke and Choi (1992) examined the association between 
uncertainty reporting and company failures in the 1981 to 1985 time period. 
Their sample consisted of surviving firms receiving clean opinions, "subject to" 
going concern qualifications, and going concern disclaimers. They matched and 
compared those firms with failed firms in order to determine the failure rates 
of firms with differing audit opinions. The results indicated that (1) firms with 
"subject to" going concern opinions had higher failure rates than firms receiving 
going concern disclaimers, and (2) firms with “subject to" going concern
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opinions had higher failure rates than firms with clean opinions. These results 
indicated that going concern opinions had information content in predicting 
bankruptcy.
Louwers, Messina, and Richard (1996) also investigated the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of going concern opinions by examining the aftermath of 231 first- 
time going concern modifications on the clients' subsequent existence. They 
studied the 1984 to 1991 time period. The results showed that a significantly 
high percentage of firms survived their first time going concern qualifications. 
The authors concluded that these warnings had little importance in determining 
clients' survival.
These two empirical studies provided mixed evidence on the self- 
fulfilling prophecy and revealed a controversy that first appeared in Williams
(1984). Garsombke and Choi (1992) supported the self-fulfilling prophecy; 
Louwers, Messina, and Richard (1996) did not. Different methodologies and 
different time periods mitigated against direct result comparisons.
Other Consequences
In many instances, qualified opinions had an impact on auditor 
switching, the self-fulfilling prophecy, and other less-researched consequences. 
Whittred (1980) examined audit report issuance delays in Australia due to 
report modifications. He classified modified reports into three groups:
(l)qualified opinions, (2) adverse opinions, and (3) disclaimers. His study 
sample addressed first time modifications only. He identified a ten-year test
i!
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period (1965-74), and he tested the delay over two periods (between year-end 
and report date, and between report date and filing with the Sydney Stock 
Exchange). The results indicated the following: (1) that first time modifications 
delayed the release of audit reports and annual reports, and (2) that more 
serious modifications resulted in longer delays. Whittred attributed the delays 
to increased negotiation between the auditors and management in light of 
negative impacts. Elliott (1982) found similar results in the U.S.
Holt and Moizer (1990) investigated the meaning of different audit 
reports to auditors and users in the U.K. Users included bankers and 
stockbrokers. The audit reports ranged from unqualified opinions to scope 
limitations to going concern qualifications. Participants answered 13 questions 
about matters ranging from reliability and usefulness of financial statements to 
responsibility of auditors. The results indicated that, for going concern 
uncertainties, and for all 13 dimensions, users felt generally less confident 
about the financial statements than did the auditors. The authors concluded 
that auditors should understand the increased uncertainty caused by this report 
type.
Abbott (1994) interviewed audit managers and partners in large CPA 
firms regarding their impression of the going concern opinion. The subjects 
mentioned that SAS No. 59 and the litigation environment increased the CPA 
firms’ documentation requirements, and those factors increased the number of 
partners involved in the audit. However, the partners and managers noted that
A
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
26
adding an explanatory paragraph did not protect the auditor from a lawsuit, 
despite the intentions behind SAS No. 59.
Carsello and Palmrose (1994) investigated lawsuit protection related to 
bankruptcy caused by allegedly inadequate warning signals. Their sample 
consisted of 655 public companies that declared bankruptcy between 1972 and 
1992. They compared audit reports before bankruptcy among three groups of 
firms: (1) those with auditor litigation, (2) those with other litigation, and (3) 
those with no litigation. The results showed relatively greater numbers of 
modified audit reports for companies with no litigation; additionally, the results 
showed that lawsuits for companies receiving modified reports had the highest 
dismissal rate and the lowest payments in cases of adverse lawsuit outcome.
The authors concluded that modified audit reports tended to weaken plaintiffs’ 
claims against auditors.
The previous three experimental studies revealed several consequences 
of qualified and modified reports, especially those due to going concern 
problems. For example, qualified opinions caused delays in releases of audit 
reports. Qualified opinions also tended to reduce users’ confidence in the 
financial statements. Empirical evidence showed modified reports due to going 
concern uncertainty protected auditors from lawsuits even though practitioners 
did not agree with this viewpoint.
Citron and Taffler (1992) investigated several consequences of qualified 
opinions in the U.K. During the period 1977 to 1986, only 26% of failing
<1
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companies received qualified opinions before bankruptcy. The results revealed 
a relationship between the likelihood of a company’s failure and the probability 
of going concern modification. The results also showed that companies with a 
going concern qualification exhibited a significantly higher rate of auditor 
switching and that most of the companies receiving going concern modifications 
survived. The auditor switching results agreed with Chow and Rice’s (1982) 
results, but the survival results differed from those of Garsombke and Choi 
(1992).
Impact of SAS No. 59
Several studies attempted to isolate the effect of SAS No. 59 on auditors 
propensity to issue going concern modified reports. For example, many studies 
attempted to determine whether SAS No. 59 caused auditors to evaluate going 
concern issues more thoroughly and issue modified reports in more audits.
Other studies investigated whether more bankrupt companies had received 
going concern opinions.
Johnson and Khurana (1995) selected a sample of 185 companies filing 
bankruptcy between 1986 and 1992. The sample excluded companies with 
fiscal years ending during the transition period between SAS No. 59 issuance 
(1988) and the effective date (January 1, 1989). Comparison of the number of 
filings during the time periods under SAS No. 34 and SAS No. 59 revealed that 
a larger proportion of bankrupt companies had received modified reports after 
SAS No. 59 became effective. This result indicated success for SAS No. 59.
J
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Raghunandan and Rama (1995) examined a sample of financially 
stressed firms to determine whether auditors had a greater propensity to issue 
going concern modified reports after SAS No. 59 became effective. They also 
examined a sample of bankrupt companies to determine if more of these 
companies received going concern opinions after the effective date of SAS No. 
59. The results indicated a greater incidence of such reports to stressed 
companies after SAS No. 59. Raghunandan and Rama also found that 
bankrupct companies were more likely to have received modified reports after 
SAS No. 59 became effective.
Employing a design similar to that of Raghunandan and Rama (1995), 
Carsello, Hermanson, and Huss (1995) tested the hypothesis that auditors in 
Big Six firms issued more going concern reports to bankrupt companies after 
SAS No. 59. They examined a sample of 250 companies and found that 
auditors were not more likely to issue such reports to bankrupt clients. The 
two previous studies treated the transition period from SAS No. 34 to SAS No. 
59 differently where the latter excluded it from the study while the former 
included it. Carsello, Hermanson and Huss (1997) reconciled these two studies 
by indicating that the treatment of this transition period substantially affected 
the results. The authors noted that there was no correct way of treating this 
period and therefore more research was needed with larger windows to reach 
more concrete conclusions.
£
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Summary
The empirical studies reviewed in this section have indicated that issuing 
qualified opinions could have negative consequences, such as auditor switching 
and the self-fulfilling prophecy, as well and positive consequences, such as 
protection from lawsuits and early warnings. Table 2.1 summarizes results of 
those studies.
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30
Author(s) and Year of 
Study
Whittred (1980)





Holt and Moizer (1990)
Purpose of Research
Delay of audit reports 
due to qualifications.
Propensity of companies 
to switch auditors after 
qualifications.
Audit partners’ 
impression of the going 
concern opinion.
Propensity of failing 
firms to switch auditors 
after qualifications.
Auditor switching for 
failing firms after 
qualifications in 
Australia.
Auditors’ and users’ 
impressions of different 
audit opinions in the 
U.K.
Summary of Findings
Audit reports delayed 
due to qualifications; 
Longer delays for more 
serious qualifications.
More companies 
switched auditors after 
receiving qualified 
opinions, but they did 
not get clean opinions 
after the switch.
Partners split on 




No evidence of auditor 
switching for failing 
firms.
More failing firms 
switched auditors after 
qualifications, with new 
auditors giving clean 
opinions.
Compared to auditors, 
users felt generally less 
confident in financial 
statements containing 
going concern audit 
opinions.
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Author(s) and Year of Purpose of Research Summary of Findings 
Study
Citron and Taffler 
(1992)









Auditor switching, self- 
fulfilling prophecy as 
consequences of going 
concern opinions in the 
U.K.
Association between 
going concern opinions 
and company failures.
Audit partners’ 
impressions of the going 
concern opinion.
Auditors’ protection 
from litigation due to 
issuing going concern 
opinions.
Impact of SAS No. 59 
on bankrupt companies’ 
audit reports.
Auditors’ propensity to 
issue going concern 
opinions, and bankrupt 
companies’ likelihood 
of receiving them after 
SAS No. 59.
An association between 
going concern opinions 
and auditor switching. 
No evidence of self- 
fulfilling prophecy.
Companies with going 
concern opinions had 
failure rates higher than 
those with clean 
opinions.
Partners did not believe 
going concern opinions 
protected them from 
litigation.
Plaintiffs with modified 
reports had weaker 




going concern opinions 
after SAS No. 59.
Auditors more likely to 
issue going concern 
opinions after SAS No. 
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TABLE 2.1 (continued)
Author(s) and Year of 
Study
Purpose of Research Summary of Findings
Carsello, Hermanson, 
and Huss (1995)
Auditors’ likelihood of 
issuing going concern 
opinions after SAS No. 
59.
Auditors not more 
likely to issue modified 
reports to bankrupt 
companies after SAS 
No. 59.
Louwers, Messina, and 
Richard (1996)
Going concern opinions 
as warning devices for 
bankruptcy.
A significantly high 
percentage of 
companies survived 
their first modified 
report.
i
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Information Content Market Studies
A number of capital market studies have investigated the information 
content of qualified opinions. A review of these studies, their implications, and 
their limitations, follows.
Alderman (1977) measured the impact of qualified opinions on the 
market’s assessment of two risk components: systematic risk and unsystematic 
risk. The sample consisted of 20 firms that received uncertainty qualified 
opinions in the 1968 to 1971 period. The control sample consisted of 20 firms 
that received unqualified opinions in the period 1965 to 1974. An examination 
the stock price of each firm in the sample before and after receiving the 
opinion determined changes in risk. The study found no significant differences 
between the experimental sample and the control sample. The author 
concluded that uncertainty qualifications had little information value regarding 
risk to investors.
Firth (1978) tested the impact of qualified opinions in the U.K. He 
examined data for the 1,500 largest U.K. firms who had their audit opinions 
qualified in the 1974-75 period. The study used the market model and 
compared the actual returns of a security against those expected if there were 
no qualified opinion. Firth divided the sample into (1) general qualifications,
(2) going concern, (3) asset valuation, (4) subsidiary’s audit, and (5) continuing 
qualifications. The results indicated significant negative returns associated with
i
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general qualifications, going concern, and asset valuations. The other 
qualifications exhibited little or no negative returns.
Banks and Kinney (1982) examined the impact on stock prices of 
different methods for reporting loss contingencies covered by FASB No. 5.
The auditors’ reporting options consisted of either a footnote disclosure only 
or a qualified opinion along with a footnote disclosure, depending on the 
auditors’ judgement regarding the uncertainty’s resolution. Their study 
controlled for the sign of the unexpected earnings and the footnote disclosure 
of the uncertainty which Alderman (1977) had ignored. The authors compared 
control and experimental samples consisting of 92 companies each and 
compared their stock returns. Firms in the experimental sample had loss 
contingencies in some years from 1969 to 1975. Firms in the experimental 
sample had significantly worse performances than those in the control sample. 
Returns for firms with qualified opinions and footnote disclosures differed from 
those in the control sample by more than those with only footnote disclosures. 
The authors argued that the audit report did not constitute the only way to 
learn about the uncertainty, but the study confirmed the report's importance. 
Therefore, Banks and Kinney concluded that qualified opinions had 
information content.
Elliott (1982) examined the methodologies of previous information 
content studies. He noted that auditors had issued qualified opinions in 
conjunction with other information of differing significance. This therefore,
J
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made it difficult to measure the impact of qualified opinions separately. Bailey 
(1982) also had noted this limitation. Elliott found significant negative security 
returns before the release of qualified opinions. This indicated that market 
participants learned of expected qualified opinions using available information 
before seeing the audit opinion.
Dodd et al. (1984) examined abnormal stock returns associated with 
announcements of qualified opinions and disclaimers of opinions. They found 
that many firms experienced abnormal negative performance before the 
announcement of qualified opinions, but not after the announcement.
However, the authors noted that their studies, like previous studies, had two 
limitations: (1) the problem of determining the exact timing of the audit report 
announcement, and (2) the problem of separating the audit report effect from 
other concurrent announcements. This study also noted that disclaimers of 
opinions appear to have very little information content.
Dopuch, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1986) attempted to overcome 
limitations in previous studies by determining the information content of 
"subject to" opinions. They examined 109 companies which received qualified 
opinions during the 1970 to 1979 period. They investigated whether media 
releases (such as in the Wall Street Journal) of qualified opinions produced 
different results from 10-K filings investigated in most capital market studies. 
The study found significant negative returns associated with media releases of 
these opinions. The authors indicated their inability to reconcile their findings
J
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with previous findings because they could not identify the selection process that 
the media employed to release only certain companies’ opinions. In general, 
they warned of the difficulties associated with detecting the information content 
in “subject to" opinions.
Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler (1989) tested the information 
content of going concern and other qualified opinions as predictors of 
bankruptcy. If proven accurate, these opinions could have served as warning 
signals to users. The sample consisted of 60 companies that declared 
bankruptcy between 1974 to 1981. The researchers selected a control group of 
55 companies for the same period; Additionally they selected a holdout 
experimental group and a control group of 32 bankrupt companies for the 1982 
to 1985 period. Holdout group data indicated the prediction accuracy of the 
opinions. Hopwood, McKeown, and Mutchler concluded that the going 
concern modified report and qualified opinions had incremental information 
content that could have served to predict bankruptcy. The study supported 
users’ arguments that qualified opinions (including going concern) served as 
useful red flags.
Loudder et al. (1992) incorporated an expectations variable in 
determining the information content of qualified opinions. Specifically, the 
authors measured the market’s assessment that auditors would issue qualified 
opinions instead of subjecting users to surprise issuances. The sample consisted 
of 101 firms with "subject to" opinions between 1983 and 1986. Loudder et al.
il
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divided the sample into two groups, expected firms and unexpected firms. The 
results showed significant negative market reaction to unexpected qualifications 
and to delayed issuances of expected qualifications. The authors argued that 
"subject to" opinions had information content, thus rendering their elimination 
premature.
Choi and Jeter (1992) provided further evidence of qualified opinion 
information content. They argued that qualified opinions had the potential of 
affecting the market’s expectation by signaling more noise or less persistence 
than expected in the earnings numbers. To determine the impact of these 
opinions on ERC (Earnings Response Coefficients), or the market’s response 
to earnings announcement, they sampled 72 companies receiving qualifications 
from 1983 to 1986. They divided the qualifications into going concern 
qualifications and all others. They then compared ERC for pre-qualification 
periods with those in periods after receipt of qualifications. The results 
indicated that the market based less reliance on reported earnings in the going 
concern violation sample-before and after the qualifications-than in the other 
sample. ERC declined significantly after the qualifications for both going 
concern and other qualifications. However, the going concern sample had a 
less significant decline. These results showed that qualified "subject to" 
opinions carried information by increasing users’ uncertainty about the financial 
statements, and they resulted in negative returns.
i i
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
38
Frost (1994) extended this line of research by examining the company’s 
risk characteristics as perceived by investors if it received an uncertainty-related 
modified report. Frost argued that a high-risk company receiving a modified 
report could have less negative returns than a low-risk company receiving such 
an opinion. She gathered data on 234 companies in the period from 1983 to 
1988 and divided the companies into high-risk and low-risk groups. The results 
confirmed the hypothesis. Low-risk companies experienced higher abnormal 
negative returns after receiving uncertainty-modified reports them did high-risk 
companies. The market, therefore, revised its expectations about the company 
after learning of the uncertainty through the audit report. Uncertainty- 
modified reports, therefore, had information content.
Ameen, Chan, and Guffey (1994) investigated the information content of 
qualified opinions for Over-the-Counter (OTC) firms. They noted that 
previous studies used NYSE and ASE firms and that the results could not 
extend to smaller firms traded in the OTC market. The sample consisted of 
177 firms receiving qualified opinions from 1974 to 1988. The results indicated 
that the market reacted negatively prior to the initial public announcement of 
the qualification, but not after the announcement or around it. Negative 
returns occurred because of the market’s expectation relative to the 
uncertainty. No further negative returns occurred around the announcement 
date. They concluded that the announcement of qualified opinions did not 
have information content.
I
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
39
Fleak and Wilson (1994) studied unexpected going concern opinions as 
possible causes of negative returns. Their study defined an unexpected going 
concern opinion as one which differed from what would be expected based on 
previously available information about the company. Their sample consisted of 
495 companies receiving going concern opinions from 1979 to 1986. The study 
separated the companies into those likely to receive going concern opinions 
and those not likely to receive such an opinion based on two models. The 
results indicated that only unexpected going concern opinions coincided with 
abnormal negative returns. The results did not show any association between 
unexpected clean opinions and positive abnormal returns. This study 
demonstrated that market participants reacted only to negative surprises and 
that expected going concern opinions had no information content.
Seipell and Tunnell (1995) tested the impact of going concern opinions 
on 75 firms' unsystematic and systematic risks. They studied the 1983 to 1987 
time period. The study matched and compared experimental firms that 
received going concern opinions with control firms that did not receive such 
opinions. The results revealed an association between an increase in 
unsystematic risk and a going concern qualified opinion. This study addressed 
the problem of trading frequency. Scholes and Williams (1977) had found that 
returns for less frequently traded securities had a downward bias. Seipell and 
TunnelTs results indicated the presence of the trading frequency problem.
After allowances for this problem, systematic risk did not increase with the
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issuance of going concern opinions. The authors noted that previous studies 
with such an association may have suffered from the nonsynchronous (i.e., 
trading frequency) problem.
Chen and Church (1996) examined the market’s expectation of 
bankruptcy based on going concern opinions. They used a sample of 98 
bankrupt companies from 1980 to 1988. They separated the sample into 
companies that received going concern opinions and those that received clean 
opinions, and they compared returns around bankruptcy. The results revealed 
that firms receiving going concern opinions before bankruptcy experienced less 
negative returns around bankruptcy than those that received clean opinions.
This indicated that going concern opinions had information
content and that they warned the market about forthcoming bankruptcies.
Summary
The previous studies examined the information content of qualified 
opinions. For the most part, going concern opinions proved useful in 
predicting bankruptcy. Unexpected qualified opinions also proved useful in 
revising risk profiles, and they resulted in abnormal negative returns. However, 
different methodologies and time periods made these studies’ findings difficult 
to compare. Table 2.2 summarizes the results of these studies.
J
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INFORMATION CONTENT MARKET STUDIES
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Banks and Kinney 
(1982)
Elliott (1982)




Impact of a qualified 
opinion on a firm’s risk 
assessment.
Impact of different 
types of qualifications 
on security returns in 
the U.K.
Impact of uncertainty 
reporting and its 
method on security 
returns.
Methodological issues 
and the association 
between qualified 




qualified opinions and 
stock prices.
Comparative security 
price impacts: media 
disclosure of qualified 
opinions vs. 10-K filings.
Summary of Findings
Uncertainty 
qualifications had little 
or no impact on risk 
assessment.
Only going concern, 




Uncertainties led to 
abnormal negative 
returns. Qualified 
opinions and footnotes 
had more information 
content than footnotes 
alone.
Significant negative 
returns occurred before 
the release of qualified 
opinions.
Abnormal negative 
returns occurred before, 
but not around or after, 
announcements of 
qualifications.
More negative returns 
associated with media 
disclosure of 
qualifications than with 
routine 10-K filings.
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TABLE 2 2  (continued)




Loudder et al. (1992)
Choi and Jeter (1992)
Frost (1994)
Ameen, Chan, and 
Guffey (1994)









studies of qualified 
opinions.
Impact of qualified 




opinions given to high- 
risk firms as compared 
to low-risk firms.
Information content of 





concern opinions on 
stock prices.
Summary of Findings
A strong association 





opinions resulted in 
negative returns, as well 





qualified opinions; the 
opinions increased 
earnings noise, and they 
decreased persistence.
Low-risk firms receiving 
qualified opinions 
showed greater negative 
returns than high-risk 
firms receiving them.
Abnormal negative 
returns before the 
announcement date, but 
not around it or after it.
Only unexpected going 
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TABLE 22  (continued)
Author(s) and Year of 
Study
Purpose of Research Summary of Findings
Seipel and Tunnell Relationship between Going concern opinions
(1995) going concern opinions 




risk, but not systematic 
risk.
Chen and Church Usefulness of going Firms receiving going




negative returns around 
bankruptcy than those 
receiving clean 
opinions.
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Information Content Experimental Studies
Few experimental studies have examined the information content of 
qualified opinions in the U.S. The experimental studies which have been 
conducted typically have focused on users’ reactions to different qualifications 
and to different methods of reporting them.
Estes and Reimer (1977) examined the effect of a qualification due to a 
minor violation of APB No. 18 where the company carried certain investments 
at cost instead of equity. Two groups of bankers responded to a mail 
questionnaire. One group received a cover letter and descriptive information 
about the company, a set of financial statements and footnotes, and an 
unqualified audit opinion. The other group received identical information, but 
with a qualified opinion. The footnotes for both groups included a description 
of the departure from APB No. 18. The bankers provided a loan amount that 
they would approve for each company. The results indicated no significant 
difference in both groups’ mean loan amounts.
Firth (1979) investigated the impact of going concern qualifications on 
bankers’ decisions in the U.K. The sample consisted of several groups of 
bankers who received the same information-except for the type of audit 
report-about a company. The audit reports were unqualified, qualified due to 
a going concern uncertainty, qualified due to asset valuation problems, and 
qualified due to a departure from GAAP. The bankers indicated the maximum 
amount that they would lend to each company. The mean loan amounts
i !
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ranged from 11 million British Pounds for unqualified opinions to 0.7 million 
British Pounds for going concern qualifications. These results indicated a 
significant difference in the risk perception based on clean opinions and going 
concern opinions. Significant differences also occurred because of asset 
valuation qualifications.
Estes and Reimer (1979) provided another study of qualified opinion 
information content. After examining the financial statements and "except for" 
qualified audit opinions for a number of companies, 1,000 financial analysts 
estimated the per-share market value of a composite firm’s stock. That 
composite firm data represented average account balances for five real 
manufacturing firms. The authors attempted to attribute any significant 
difference in decisions to the audit report and not to the company’s financial 
statements. To achieve this goal, they designated a violation of APB No. 18 as 
the independent variable. They presented two groups of financial analysts with 
the same information, except for the audit report. Financial analysts who 
reacted to the "except for" opinion estimated a significantly lower stock price 
than analysts who reacted to the unqualified opinion. The authors concluded 
that qualified opinions had information content to financial analysts. This is 
contrary to the results of their earlier (1977) study which showed no 
information content to bankers.
Libby provided two significant studies in this line of research concerning 
the impact of uncertainties on bank loan officers’ perceptions and decisions.
i\
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
46
Libby (1979a) presented loan officers with 10 different kinds of audit opinions 
to test their understanding of the meaning of each opinion and compared their 
understanding with that of CPAs’. The opinions ranged from unqualified to 
qualified because of uncertainties to disclaimers of opinions. Libby asked 
bankers and auditors to answer a number of questions about the reliability of 
the financial statements and their usefulness. The results indicated no 
significant differences between auditors and bankers in interpreting the 
meaning of the audit opinions. The study also showed that uncertainty 
qualifications, by themselves, increased bankers’ perception of loan risk. The 
latter finding suggested that qualified opinions due to uncertainty had 
information content.
In a related study, Libby (1979b) examined the location and method of 
disclosing uncertainties. The uncertainty concerned litigation for a defendant 
company in a lawsuit. Libby divided loan officers into three groups. Each 
received an unqualified opinion, a disclosure only, or a disclosure with a 
qualified opinion. The loan officers estimated the appropriate interest rate to 
charge above the prime rate. The results showed that the disclosure of the 
uncertainty increased bankers’ risk perception. However, adding a qualified 
opinion to a footnote disclosure did not affect risk perception. This study did 
not find information content in qualified opinions, and it supported the CAR’s 
recommendation to eliminate them. Libby concluded that qualified opinions 
were redundant in the presence of appropriate footnote disclosure. Berthold
I
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(1979) and Schultz (1979) criticized Libby’s study because Libby had enclosed 
a statement predicting the outcome of the uncertainty. Therefore, the test 
contained no genuine uncertainty. However, Libby’s study did provide an 
important insight into banker perceptions of qualified opinions.
Firth (1980) extended his earlier study of bankers’ decision making in 
the U.K. The later study investigated whether qualified opinions affected 
bankers’ lending decisions. Firth mailed financial statements of two 
hypothetical companies to loan officers; those two companies differed only by 
audit report type. Company A was in good financial condition and company B 
was in poor condition. Firth asked the bankers to state the maximum loan 
amount they would grant to each company. The audit opinions varied as 
follows: (1) unqualified, (2) qualified due to going concern uncertainty,
(3) qualified due to asset valuation, and (4) qualified due to departure from 
GAAP. The results indicated significant differences in loan amounts between 
the company with a clean opinion and the one with a going concern qualified 
opinion. The company with a going concern opinion would have received a 
substantially smaller loan than the one with a clean opinion. This study, 
indicated that, in the U.K., qualified opinions had information content.
Houghton (1983) investigated the information content of qualified 
opinions in Australia. The sample consisted of 247 bank loan officers who 
received a loan application from a hypothetical company. Houghton divided 
the sample into two groups. One group received information about the
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company and an unqualified opinion. The other group received the same 
information about the company and a qualified audit opinion. The 
qualification referred a lawsuit against the company. The results indicated no 
significant differences in bankers’ decisions about the company with a qualified 
opinion and the one with the unqualified opinion. The author attributed the 
lack of information content to either the audit report’s having no importance 
in decision making or to the audit report’s having less importance than other 
information in the financial statements.
Abdel-khalik, Graul, and Newton (1986) extended Libby’s (1979b) study 
to a Canadian environment. Auditors no longer issued qualified opinions in 
Canada at the time of this study, and, therefore, the environment differed from 
the one in the U.S. The sample consisted of commercial loan officers who 
received financial information about several companies and several different 
audit report types. Some audit reports had unqualified opinions, some had a 
"two-sided opinion" indicating that presentation in the U.S. would require a 
qualification, and some had a "subject to" qualified opinion due to an 
uncertainty involving litigation. Each banker assessed each firm’s risk 
(measured as an interest rate premium), and each banker estimated the 
probability of each firm’s default. The study’s research design attempted to 
overcome Libby’s problems. The findings showed that bankers regarded 
disclosure of the uncertainty as relevant information. However, the addition of 
a "subject to" qualified opinion had no significant impact on bankers’ decisions
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beyond what a footnote only would disclose. These findings supported the 
CAR’s recommendation to eliminate uncertainty qualified opinions because of 
their redundancy.
Gul (1987) tested the information content of qualified opinions in 
Singapore. The study used an actual company with a fictitious name in an 
experiment to compare the effects of qualified opinions and footnotes on 
bankers’ decisions. Gul studied the effects of three reporting methods: (1) no 
uncertainty disclosure, (2) a footnote disclosure only, and (3) a "subject to" 
qualified opinion and a footnote disclosure. The uncertainty concerned 
pending litigation. Each banker estimated an interest rate premium for a loan 
granted to this company. The results indicated that for every additional level 
of disclosure, the bankers had an increased perception of risk. Qualified 
opinions, therefore, had information content to Singapore bankers. This 
conclusion did not support the CAR’s recommendation to eliminate them.
Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990) provided an early modified report 
impact study on going concern uncertainty due to risk. They divided the 
undergraduate student subjects into two groups. The first group received five 
sets of financial statements (including footnotes) accompanied by qualified 
opinions due to going concern uncertainty for actual companies. The other 
group received identical financial statements accompanied by modified reports 
(opinions with explanatory paragraphs) due to going concern uncertainty. The 
students ranked the five companies in terms of investment potential. The
A
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authors employed a between-groups and within-groups design to examine 
differences in company rankings. The results indicated no significant 
differences between subjects who received qualified opinions and those who 
received modified reports. The method of reporting going concern did not 
matter as long as the auditor communicated the message. Within-subject 
comparisons revealed that subjects who received qualified opinions had more 
similar rankings compared to subjects who received modified reports. The 
authors attributed this within-subject difference to increased confusion caused 
by an unqualified opinion with an explanatory paragraph. This confusion, real 
or imaginary, strongly supported the CAR’s recommendation to eliminate all 
reference to the uncertainty in the audit report.
Houghton and Messier (1991) examined the effect of qualified opinions 
on auditors and bankers. The sample consisted of Florida bankers and 
auditors. They utilized six types of audit reports: (1) unqualified, (2) qualified 
due to departure from GAAP, (3) qualified due to scope limitation,
(4) modified due to uncertainty, (5) adverse due to departure from GAAP, and 
(6) disclaimer of opinion. The results indicated no significant differences in the 
meanings of audit reports between bankers and auditors. However, auditors 
viewed the wording of the modified report due to uncertainty as more negative 
than the bankers, who saw it as neutral. The study did not clearly define 
uncertainty, and the wording of the modified report differed from the wording 
of SAS No. 58 or SAS No. 59.
A
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LaSalle and Anandarajan (1997) compared the influences of a modified 
report due to uncertainties and a  disclaimer of opinion on bankers’ decisions. 
They provided information about two actual companies to 490 loan officers.
The first company had a material lawsuit uncertainty, and the second company 
had going concern uncertainty. They divided the sample into two groups who 
received reports for both companies. Each participant received either a 
modified report with an explanatory paragraph or a disclaimer of opinion for 
each company. Participants granted or rejected a requested line of credit to 
each company. None of the loan officers granted the line of credit for the firm 
with a disclaimer of opinion, while only 9% agreed to the line of credit for the 
firm with going concern uncertainties, but 42% approved credit for the firm 
with other uncertainties. The authors concluded that the method of reporting 
mattered less for firms with going concern uncertainties than for firms with 
other uncertainties. These results suggested that going concern uncertainties, 
rather than the auditor’s method of reporting, caused credit rejection.
Bamber and Stratton (1997) provided evidence that the audit report 
modified for other uncertainties had information content. In this case, the 
uncertainty involved a potential litigation loss. They surveyed 77 bank loan 
officers in seven banks and presented them with multi-year financial statements 
and the current year’s footnotes that included the uncertainty. The study 
divided the participants into eight groups. Each participant in each group 
received information about two companies with either a standard audit report
d
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or a modified report. The results showed that bankers granted a loan less 
often to a company with a modified report compared to a company with a 
standard report and assigned a higher interest rate premium to the former 
company. The bankers also weighted the modified audit report and the 
footnote as more important in their decision compared to the standard report.
Summary
The previous experimental studies provided mixed evidence on the 
information content of qualified and modified reports. Most of the studies 
conducted in the U.S., Canada, and Australia found no significant information 
content of these opinions, while studies conducted in other countries found 
significant information content. The following table summarizes those studies.
A
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INFORMATION CONTENT EXPERIMENTAL STUDIES
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Author(s) and Year of 
Study








Impact of qualified 
opinions on bankers’ 
decisions.
Impact of qualified 
audit opinions for 
different reasons on 
bankers in the U.K.
Impact of qualified 
opinions on financial 
analysts’ stock price 
estimates.
Difference between 
auditors’ and bankers’ 
perceptions of different 
audit opinions.
Impact of uncertainty 
reporting method on 
bankers’ loan decisions.
Summary of Findings
No difference between 
amount loaned to firms 
with unqualified 
opinions accompanied 
by foot-notes and firms 
with qualified opinions 
ac-companied by 
footnotes.
Qualified audit opinions 
due to going concern 
and asset valuation had 




assigned higher risk 
(lower stock price) to a 
company with a 
qualified opinion than 
to a comparable same 
company with a clean 
opinion.
No difference between 





Qualified opinions were 
redundant in the 
presence of footnote 
disclosures.
t\
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TABLE 2 3  (continued)
Author(s) and Year of 
Study
Purpose of Research Summary of Findings
Firth (1980) Impact of different 
qualified opinions for 
two companies on 
bankers’ decisions in 
the U.K.
Qualified opinions due 
to going concern 
uncertainty and asset 
valuation had significant 
information content.
Houghton (1983) Impact of qualified 
opinions due to 




difference between a 
qualified opinion and 





(1979b) study in 
Canada. Impact of 
qualification on loan 
risk.
No significant risk 
difference between 
qualified opinion with 
footnote and only 




Pringle, Crum, and 
Swetz (1990)
Bankers’ perception of 





qualified and modified 
reports due to going 
concern uncertainty.
Risk perception 
increased with every 
additional level of 
disclosure.
No difference between 
qualified opinions and 
modified going concern 
reports.
i!
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Author(s) and Year of Purpose of Research Summary of Findings 
Study






Difference in audit 
report meaning between 
auditors and bankers.
Difference in bankers’ 
risk assessment based 
on modified reports and 
disclaimers of opinions 
due to other 
uncertainties and going 
concern uncertainty.
Information content of 
modified audit report 
due to a potential 
litigation loss compared 
to an unqualified 
opinion.
No difference in 
meaning perception 
between auditors and 
bankers. Auditors 
viewed modified reports 
as more negative than 
bankers.
More bankers rejected 
a credit line for going 
concern uncertainties 
than for other 
uncertainties. Reporting 
method made a 
difference only with 
other uncertainties.
Bankers granted a loan 
less often to a company 
with a modified report 
compared to a company 
with an unqualified 
opinion. The modified 
report due to other 
uncertainties had 
information content to 
bankers.
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The previous literature review indicated the auditing profession’s 
concern about the expectation gap. The ASB issued SAS No. 58, SAS No. 59, 
and recently amended SAS No. 58 to deal with this issue. The capital markets 
literature partially supported users’ argument for the usefulness of warning 
signals. However, most of the experimental studies in the U.S. have shown that 
qualified or modified reports, even those concerning going concern 
uncertainties, contained no significant warning signals beyond what appropriate 
footnotes disclosed. The following chapter addresses the current study of 
modified report information content.
il
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
This chapter discusses the research methodology employed in this study. 
It presents the theory leading to the research, as well as the study’s hypotheses. 
Discussions of the experimental design, the sample, and the statistical tests 
follow.
Theory and Hypotheses Development
As presented in the previous chapter, substantially less research has 
examined the going concern explanatory paragraph in the audit report 
compared to the qualified "subject to" opinion. Therefore, this study has 
investigated the usefulness of the explanatory paragraph in decision-making and 
the existence or (non-existence) of additional signals attributable to it.
The theory behind the current study originated in the CAR’s 
recommendation, as implemented by the ASB in SAS No. 59, and SAS No. 79, 
which dealt with going concern uncertainties. Previous experimental studies, 
especially those dealing with bankers, have reinforced that theory.
In 1978, the CAR recommended that the audit report not contain 
references to uncertainties, as long as footnotes provided adequate disclosures.
57
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The commission regarded the inclusion of this information in the audit report 
as redundancy that did not serve a useful purpose. The Commission noted, 
however, that users demanded appropriate disclosure of the uncertainty to draw 
their attention to the problem and to enable them to make informed decisions.
From the ASB’s point of view, the going concern issue deserved special 
attention and warranted a special standard, SAS No. 59. However, the 
reasoning behind SAS No. 59 bore a similarity to that behind SAS No. 58, 
namely the auditor’s responsibility to emphasize uncertainty in an explanatory 
paragraph. Many users did not fully understand the Board’s objective and 
believed that the explanatory paragraph contained additional information on 
the uncertainty. This misunderstanding prompted the board to amend SAS No. 
58 and eliminate the explanatory paragraph requirement.
The ASB revealed a major reason for issuing SAS No. 79 when it stated 
that: "The required uncertainties explanatory paragraph does not and should not 
communicate new information to financial statement users" (emphasis added). 
Therefore, if the ASB believed that the uncertainty paragraph merely 
emphasized the uncertainty as explained in the footnote, one could have 
reasonably hypothesized the same belief for the going concern uncertainty. At 
the time of this study, it appears that the ASB did not indicate the same belief 
for going concern uncertainty.
The foregoing has relied upon the CAR’s recommendation, its 
implementation by the ASB, and the ASB’s specific mention of the role of the
i i
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explanatory paragraph. It has led to a general hypothesis that the user will 
make the same decision based on an audit report with an explanatory 
paragraph as he will based on an audit report without the paragraph; the 
paragraph constitutes a redundancy (CAR), and it does not communicate new 
information (ASB, SAS No. 79).
Estes and Reimer (1977); Libby (1979b); Abdel-Khalik, Graul, and 
Newton (1986); Pringle, Crum and Swetz (1990); and LaSalle and 
Anandarajan (1997) tested this hypothesis. They all reached the same general 
conclusion: the method of reporting the uncertainty, including the going 
concern uncertainty, did not significantly affect users’ decisions. This 
conclusion held for qualified opinions (Estes and Reimer (1977), Libby(1979b) 
and Abdel-Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986)) and for modified reports 
(Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990) and LaSalle and Anandarajan (1997)). In 
other words, the uncertainty itself, rather than the reporting method affected 
the decision. These findings contradicted users’ arguments about the usefulness 
of the reporting method.
This study has tested four hypotheses relative to the information content 
of explanatory paragraphs.
Hypothesis 1. Bankers’ estimate of the likelihood of granting a line of 
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a 
footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the estimate to the 
same company on the basis of an unqualified opinion and a footnote 
disclosure.
Hypothesis 2: The interest rate that bankers would charge for a line of 
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a
(I
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footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the interest rate the 
bankers would charge to the same company on the basis of an unqualified 
opinion and a footnote disclosure.
Hypothesis 3: Bankers’ confidence in their lending decision for a given 
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote 
disclosure would not differ substantially from their confidence for a loan to the 
same company on the basis o f an unqualified opinion and a footnote 
disclosure.
Hypothesis 4: Bankers’ perception of bankruptcy likelihood for a given 
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote 
disclosure would not differ substantially from their perception about the same 
company on the basis of an unqualified opinion and a footnote disclosure.
The first hypothesis addressed the company’s relative risk, with the 
expectation that lower likelihood of granting the line of credit would coincide 
with loan officers’ perceptions of higher risk. The interest rate that a bank 
would charge on a line of credit could also serve as an estimate of risk. The 
second hypothesis, in the null form, therefore, has addressed that aspect of risk 
measurement.
As its secondary objective, this study sought to determine the "side 
effects" of the going concern explanatory paragraph. According to the CAR, 
the clause "subject to" gave some users the false impression that upon 
resolution of the uncertainty, the company would restate its financial position. 
While the going concern explanatory paragraph continued to contain a 
statement that "the financial statements did not include any adjustments that 
might result from the outcome of this uncertainty," users’ interpretation of that 
statement remained unclear. Any confusion, however, should tend to 
undermine users’ confidence in the financial statements. Accordingly, the
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third hypothesis addressed the issue of loan officers’ confidence in their 
decision.
In making its recommendation to eliminate qualified opinions, the CAR 
noted that some users believed that the absence of a qualification indicated no 
uncertainties. However, the commission noted that all businesses faced a 
certain degree of risk, and they considered a user misperception undesirable. 
The previous arguments have led to the assumption that users receiving a 
modified report (i.e., an explanatory paragraph) would perceive a higher degree 
of uncertainty (bankruptcy in the case of going concern modified reports) as 
opposed to users receiving an unqualified opinion (i.e., with no explanatory 
paragraph). Hypothesis 4 addressed this concern.
Research Method
Experimental Design
This study utilized an experimental method, sometimes called intact 
equivalent design, to test the four hypotheses. It divided the subjects into two 
groups that resembled each other as much as possible. As noted by Bailey’s 
(1982) criteria, this served as an appropriate design for testing the effect of 
audit opinion attributes; it avoided the major problem associated with market 
studies, namely audit reports released concurrent with financial information. 
Those concurrent releases generally have added to the difficulty of separating 
the effect of the audit report from the financial information.
A
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The two groups made particular estimates and indicated certain 
perceptions. The intact equivalent design method compared the results in a 
between-groups analysis. Pany and Reckers (1987) had examined the merit of 
within-subjects vs. between-subjects designs and concluded that between- 
subjects designs produced superior analyses. Applying Pany and Reckers’ 
arguments to the current study, if within-subjects design was used, it would 
have been possible for a respondent to express his individual preference for the 
explanatory paragraph regardless of its actual information content. The 
between-subject design avoided this problem by presenting each subject with 
only one alternative.
Kinney (1986) had offered a discussion of common problems with 
between-subjects designs. He had noted that in order to measure the effect of 
X (treatment) on Y (decision), the researcher had to recognize V s (other 
factors) that may have influenced Y. Relevant V’s, according to Kinney (1986) 
included the subjects’ personality traits, mathematical ability, education, 
experience, and firm association. This study treated the presence of V’s 
through two approaches. First, the study specifically incorporated other factors 
possibly affecting a lending decision into the decision-making model and 
recognized that those factors may have had an impact on the different Y’s. 
Specifically, lending officers’ experience, accounting education, auditing 
education, and bank size comprised the V’s.
il
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The study then randomized away the remaining V s (individual 
respondent’s risk preference or individual bank risk preference) in the total 
sample. On average, this made the two groups equivalent on the V s. In as 
much as possible, this design isolated the effect of the treatment on the lending 
decision. In terms of the previous discussion this exposed one group to a 
modified going concern audit report, and it exposed the other group to an 
unqualified audit opinion. Both groups had access to the same financial 
statements and company information.
Sample Selection
The subjects of this study consisted of commercial loan officers. The 
study used them because of the lending decision's importance to companies 
who frequently resort to bank financing. Lending decisions also mattered to 
the ASB because bankers make extensive use of financial information 
(Stephens (1980)) and the audit report. Any inappropriate reporting policies 
by the ASB, therefore, can have consequences on both bankers and companies. 
Users, including bankers, also provided the most input to SAS No. 59 exposure 
draft which indicated that they considered going concern reporting a major 
issue.
The sample for this study was selected from a database provided by the 
Polk Bank Directory. That database provided addresses of loan officers at 
different banks around the country. The study targeted no particular 
geographic area. The loan officers received the questionnaire in their offices
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and worked in banks with at least $100 million of assets. Two factors made the 
last condition necessary. First, smaller banks may or may not have required 
audited financial statements in a lending decision; therefore, these loan officers 
may or may not have understood the different types of audit reports. Second, 
the study used an actual public company (as explained later) that made it 
necessary for sampled banks to have the ability to lend money to such a 
customer. Since most smaller banks face capital constraints and probably do 
not deal with such companies, loan officers of smaller banks may not have 
provided realistic responses.
Each selected banker received an actual company’s financial statements, 
an audit report, footnotes, and a questionnaire. Each of the two equal groups 
in the sample received the same information except for the audit report. One 
group received a going concern modified audit report and a footnote explaining 
the going concern situation. This is the current practice required by SAS No. 
59. The other group received an unqualified audit opinion and the same 
footnote. This is not the current way of reporting going concern uncertainty.
Case Company
Data for the company selected as a case example appeared in the 
Compact Disclosures database and met four criteria: (1) the company had 
publicly traded--and still actively traded-stock (i.e., had not declared 
bankruptcy); (2) it had received a going concern opinion in the most recent
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annual report; (3) it had at least one shareholder, one employee, a positive 
cash balance, inventory; and finally, (4) it was incorporated in the U.S.
After determining the pool of companies that met the stated criteria, the 
screening process considered the company’s industry, audit report modification, 
and size. The process eliminated companies in industries such as oil and gas 
and medical technology due to the possible unfamiliarity of many loan officers 
with their business conditions. The process then examined audit report 
modifications to eliminate any companies that received a modification for 
reasons other than going concern uncertainties, or in addition to such 
uncertainties. For example, some companies faced several uncertainties such 
as a lawsuit requiring an explanatory paragraph, as well as going concern 
difficulties requiring another explanatory paragraph. The process eliminated 
such companies because of uncertainties as to whether loan officers would have 
reacted to the other uncertainty paragraph, the going concern issue paragraph, 
or both. Also, the screening process eliminated companies that recently had 
adopted a new FASB standard or otherwise changed accounting methods. 
Finally, the process reviewed each company’s size in terms of total assets and 
total sales in order to match the sample company’s needs with the lending 
capacities of the banks included in the survey.
Case Development
The company actually chosen manufactured and distributed cosmetics 
and other beauty products and qualified as a "typical customer" for many banks,
ii
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especially with its $10 million in assets and $32 million in sales. Information 
related to the business, stock prices, ownership, and employees was taken from 
the firm’s most recent 10-K report. The information package also included 
condensed financial statements, the audit report, and relevant footnotes in 
summarized form. However, the going concern footnote appeared exactly as 
written in the Form 10-K for that year.
In the next case development step, selected loan officers reviewed the 
case and the questionnaire. The loan officers indicated the need for additional 
information about the company’s business, as well as a summary of its 
outstanding debts. They also suggested that an appropriate loan amount for 
this company would be in the $750,000 - $1 million range. That amount 
matched the minimum reasonable requirements of the sample company with 
the lending capacities of surveyed banks. They also indicated that the 
information package should include the purpose of the loan and available 
collateral; they assigned little likelihood to a bank’s granting an unsecured line 
of credit. The discussions with the loan officers led to the choice of a one-year 
secured working capital line of credit in the range of $750,000 - $1 million, with 
the accounts receivable and inventory serving as collateral.
The information package withheld the name of the company and its 
subsidiaries to avoid biasing their opinion for or against this company. Some of 
these bankers may have dealt with this company or known about it. The
j
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package did not reveal the audit firm name. A sample of the case study is 
provided in Appendices A and B.
Questionnaire and Task
The cover letter did not specifically reveal the purpose of the study in 
order to avoid the influence of the bankers’ personal opinions regarding the 
explanatory paragraph on the decision. However, the cover letter noted that 
the study addressed risk. Completing the survey instrument required no more 
than 20 minutes of each respondent’s time. The consulting loan officers 
deemed this range reasonable. Appendix A also includes a copy of the 
questionnaire.
The first group of questions asked the loan officers to estimate the 
likelihood of their granting the requested line of credit. The questionnaire 
provided a seven-point Likert scale for that answer. The phrasing of the 
question controlled for accountability in organizations. According to Fandt and 
Ferris (1990), accountability can cause employees to make more conservative 
decisions. In this case, it could have caused the loan officers to reject the line 
of credit for reasons unrelated to the study. The questionnaire then asked the 
loan officers to estimate a risk premium above the prime rate. Because banks 
have different prime rates, the questionnaire gave a specified prime rate as a 
starting point.
O ther questions were designed to measure bankruptcy estimate and 
confidence levels. They, also, utilized a seven-point Likert scale. Finally, the
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questionnaire asked for demographic characteristics such as experience, 
accounting education, auditing education, and bank size. These characteristics 
possibly could serve as explanatory variables that could have influenced 
different estimates.
Statistical Tests
The statistical tests employed to test the hypotheses depended, among 
other things, on the measurement scale used to measure the estimate or the 
perception. Several types of scales exist: Nominal, ordinal, interval and ratio. 
This study used ordinal and interval scales. An ordinal scale implies a 
statement of "greater than" or "less than” where if a> b  and b > c  then a> c 
without stating how much greater or less. Emory and Cooper (1991) explained 
that an ordinal scale is like a rubber yardstick that can stretch varying amounts 
across its length. Thus, the real difference between 1 and 2 may be more or 
less than the difference between 2 and 3. Interval scales ,on the other hand, 
require that the distance between 1 and 2 equals the distance between 2 and 3. 
Mathematical computations can be used on interval scales where the mean is 
the measure of central tendency.
It is important for the researcher to correctly classify a measurement 
scale since the statistical tests employed will depend on this classification. For 
example, parametric statistics, such as ANOVA, are usually more powerful tests 
than nonparametric tests such as chi-square tests. However, parametric tests 
can only be used with a measurement scale that is at least interval, provided
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that other assumptions are met, as explained later. The questionnaire used in 
this study gathered information from bankers through two methods: a seven- 
point Likert scale where the respondent had to estimate his perception on this 
scale and an interest rate estimate where the respondent estimated an actual 
interest rate. Although the latter form of measurement is easy to classify as 
interval, the former scale is not easily classified.
According to Emory and Cooper (1991), many behavioral researchers 
use Likert scales as interval scales and therefore apply parametric tests to the 
data. Seigel and Castellan (1988) noted that the researcher would actually be 
adding information if he used parametric tests on data that was less than 
interval because he was assuming that the distances within the scale were 
equal. On the other hand, Anderson (1980) noted that the difference between 
parametric and nonparametric tests was not great insofar as significance level 
and power were concerned. Therefore, the type of measurement scale used 
had little relevance in selecting the statistical tests.
Srinivasan and Basu (1989) noted that ordinal scales were easy to use 
and they generated a higher response rate. They also noted that continuous 
variables gave a false sense of precision since most subjects would choose 
multiples of 10 when responding on a scale of 1 to 100, for example.
Srinivasan and Basu showed that ordinal scales could be used as metric 
measures with very little loss of information resulting from a smaller interval 
and they quantified this loss of information. Assuming that Likert scales were
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ordinal scales, they developed an index of metric quality defined as the ratio of 
the predictive power of the ordered categorical variable to the predictive power 
of the underlying continuous variable. They found that the loss of information 
was less than 10% when at least a five point scale was used. Therefore, they 
recommended the use of a scale of at least five equal categories.
Because the issue of treating a Likert scale as ordinal or interval was 
controversial, this study employed both parametric and nonparametric tests on 
the data. Nonparametric tests were used to ease the restrictive assumptions 
underlying parametric tests.
Parametric Tests
Emory and Cooper (1991) noted that parametric tests, in general, make 
the following assumptions about the data. First, it is assumed that both group 
populations had a normal distribution. Second, it is assumed that these 
populations have equal variances and finally, the observations should be 
independent. They argued that some parametric tests were robust to minor 
violations of these assumptions while other tests were not.
Equality of Means
The t test measured the equality of the means of two independent 
samples. It tested whether the estimate or the perception made by the group 
receiving a modified report and footnote differed significantly from the one 
made by the group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote. The test
il
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determined whether the mean likelihood of granting the line of credit differed 
significantly between groups, whether the level of confidence and bankruptcy 
perception differed, and whether the interest rate estimates differed. If the two 
sample means were found to be significantly different, the null hypotheses 
would be rejected and if the difference was not significant, they would not be 
rejected.
Ordinary Least Squares
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression determined the impact, if any, 
of the explanatory variables on each estimate or perception. For example, did 
factors such as experience as a loan officer, accounting and audit education, 
and bank size affect the likelihood of granting the line of credit? In this case, 
the dependent variable consisted of the estimate (or the perception) and 
explanatory items comprised the independent variables. The study employed 
the following model, and it used Ordinary Least Squares separately for each 
estimate or perception.
Y = BO + BlParag + B2Exp + B3Acc + B4Audit + B5Size + e 
where:
Y = the likelihood of granting the line of credit, the level of
confidence, the estimate of bankruptcy (all on a 1 to 7 scale) 
and the interest rate estimate.
Parag = 1 if received the explanatory paragraph 
0 if received only the footnote
J
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Exp = 1 if less than 5 years of experience
2 if between 5 and 10 years
3 if between 11 and 15 years
4 if between 16 and 20 years
5 if more than 20 years of experience
Acc = 1 if less than 2 accounting courses
2 if 2 or 3 courses
3 if 4 or 5 courses
4 if 6 or 7 courses
5 if more than 7 courses
Audit = 1 if respondent had an auditing course
0 if respondent did not have an auditing course
Size = 1 if between $100 and $299.9 million of assets
2 if between $300 and $499.9 million
3 if between $500 and $999.9 million
4 if between $1 and $4.9 billion
5 if over $5 billion of assets
e = the error term
B0 = the intercept
Bl, B2, B3, B4 and B5 = parameters estimates.
If a statistically significant relationship was found between any of the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variable, this would be useful to 
companies in their search for a loan since granting it might depend on a 
particular loan officer or a particular bank.
Nonparametric Tests
According to Emory and Cooper(1991), nonparametric tests are most 
often used when the assumptions underlying the parametric tests are not met.
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about 95% compared to similar parametric tests.
This study used the Kolmogorov-Smimov two-sample test. This test is 
primarily concerned with the agreement between two cumulative distributions , 
but both represent sample values. The purpose of the test is to determine 
whether the two distribution functions associated with the two populations are 
identical or not. Therefore, it draws conclusions about the two group 
populations of bankers based on the two samples of respondents. Conover
(1980) explained that other tests such as the median test or the Mann-Whitney 
test may detect differences between two means or medians, but they may not 
detect differences of other types, such as differences in variances. The 
advantage of the Kolmogorov-Smimov test is that it is consistent against all 
types of differences that may exist between the two distribution functions. This 
test assumed only that the two samples were random samples and that they 
were mutually independent. According to Conover (1980), for this test to be 
exact, the random variables were assumed to be continuous. However, the test 
was still valid with discrete variables and produced conservative results. This 
meant that approximate results would be obtained that would be slightly larger 
than actual results.
If F(X) represents the distribution function of the group receiving the 
modified report and the footnote diclosure while G(X) represents the 
distribution function of the group receiving the unqualified report and the
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footnote disclosure. The null hypothesis in this case would be that F(X) = 
G(X) and the alternative hypothesis would be that they were not equal. The 
test proceeded by calculating the maximum absolute difference between the 
two distribution functions and compared this calculated difference against a 
tabulated difference. The significance level for a two-tailed test was set at 0.10. 
If the calculated difference was larger than the tabulated difference, the null 
hypothesis was rejected and concluded that the explanatory paragraph had 
information content, and if it were smaller, the null hypothesis could not be 
rejected.
Summary
This chapter presented the theory leading to the study’s hypotheses, the 
case selection and development procedures and the statistical tests employed. 
Parametric (t-test and regression) and nonparametric tests (the Kolmogorov- 
Smimov test) were employed depending on the type of scale used and the 
assumptions about the data.
The following chapter presents the results of the data analysis. This is 
followed by the results of the different statistical tests employed and the 
general conclusions of these results.
l\




The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the survey data collection 
procedures and results. It explains the two major parts of data collection: the 
pilot study and the main study. A  discussion of the response rate as well as the 
sample characteristics is presented. In addition, a test of potential nonresponse 
bias is discussed. This is followed by a review of the data analysis methods and 
hypotheses tests.
Data Collection Procedures
To collect the survey data, two phases were essential: the pilot study 
and the main part of the study.
The Pilot Study
The pilot study had several purposes. First, since the questions asked 
were not replicated from other studies, it was necessary to determine whether 
the bankers understood the meaning of each question and could easily answer 
it without confusion. Second, even though the case information and 
questionnaire were developed after consulting with local bankers, it was
75
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important to determine whether any necessary information was missing.
Finally, the pilot study would give the researcher an indication of the potential 
response rate for the main study which would help in planning the appropriate 
sample size. The sample size for the pilot study needed to be large enough to 
reach a representative sample of bankers yet small enough to fulfill the limited 
objectives of the pilot study. A  sample of 100 was deemed appropriate.
To select a random sample from the database, each name and address 
was given a number. The total number of names and addresses were divided 
by 100 to obtain an interval. A  random starting point was blindly selected from 
the first interval and every nth name and address thereafter was selected to 
reach a total sample size of 100. This method of systematic random sampling 
is widely used by auditors in selecting items such as accounts receivable for 
confirmation.
The selected bankers were then divided into two equal groups and 
mailed a sample case along with questions and a postage-paid return envelope. 
The respondent was asked to indicate the date when he completed this 
questionnaire. This date would serve later to test for any difference between 
early and late respondents. It was determined that using the date of 
completion was better than the date of mailing since different banks had 
different mailing systems and a letter could be mailed the following day or it 
could take up to a week for it to be mailed. This prediction was confirmed by 
comparing the noted date of completion to the postmark date on the return
I
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envelope. It was found that many responses were mailed immediately while 
others took several days. Most of the responses were received within a two- 
week period after the initial mailing with a few received in the third and fourth 
weeks. Out of the total of 100 mailings, 15 return envelopes were received. 
Three respondents indicated that the bank did not have a commercial lending 
department and therefore were not able to provide a usable response. There 
were 12 usable responses, representing a usable response rate of 12%. They 
consisted of seven responses from the group that received the modified report 
and the footnote and five responses from the group receiving the unqualified 
report and the footnote. All respondents answered all the questions. In other 
words, no information was missing.
The information provided by the bankers was analyzed and it appeared 
that they fully understood the questions. Therefore, the pilot study fulfilled its 
three main objectives: the questions were understood, no necessary 
information was missing, and a predicted response rate was obtained.
The Main Study
After the pilot study was completed, it was determined that no changes 
were needed in the case or the questionnaire. Therefore, the main part of the 
study was initiated.
Assuming that the response rate in the main study would be similar to 
the one in the pilot study, a sample size of 2,100 was deemed appropriate.
This sample would be large enough to provide meaningful statistical analysis.
J
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Two mailings were conducted: the first mailing (consisting of 900 bankers) 
covered the Northeastern and Southeastern U.S. and the second mailing 
(consisting of 1,200 bankers) covered the rest of the country. A t test on the 
likelihood of granting the credit scale indicated no significant difference 
between the two mailings for the group receiving the modified report and the 
footnote (t = -0.7, p = 0.47) and for the group receiving the unqualified 
report and the footnote (t = -0.21, p = 0.83). The sample selection method 
was the same as the pilot study. Even though the database provided the names 
and addresses of the vice presidents for lending in these banks, the cover letter 
indicated that they could forward the case to another loan officer in their 
banks.
Most of the responses were received in the two-week period following 
the mailing, although a few were received up to four weeks later. A total of 
290 responses were received representing a general response rate of 13.8%.
The first mailing generated 130 responses of which 117 responses were usable. 
The usable response rate was 13%. The second mailing generated 160 
responses of which 153 responses were usable. The usable response rate was 
12.75%. Therefore, the main part of the study consisted of 270 responses 
representing a response rate of 12.85%.
The unusable responses were similar to the ones received in the pilot 
study. The bankers indicated that their banks were not involved in commercial 
lending, and therefore, the questionnaire was returned intact. Examining both
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groups under consideration, 134 responses were returned from the group 
receiving the modified report and the footnote while 136 responses were 
returned from the group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote. 
Examining the postmark stamp on the return envelope, it was determined that 
the respondents were scattered across the country. Out of the 270 responses 
received, only eight contained partially missing information. For example, a 
questionnaire would be missing an interest rate or a confidence estimate. In 
analyzing the data, if a particular scale or interest rate were missing, the 
respondent was omitted from this particular analysis.
Test for Nonresponse Bias
A common consideration in survey studies is the impact of 
nonrespondents on the study’s conclusions. If the nonrespondents represent a 
significant percentage, some concern exists that they have characteristics 
different from the respondents’.
A common technique used by researchers to test for nonresponse bias is 
to compare early respondents to late respondents to determine if their answers 
to the same question were different. This technique assumes that 
nonrespondents possess the same characteristics as late respondents. The null 
hypothesis in this case was that there was no difference between early and late 
respondents. This analysis was separately conducted on both groups of 
bankers. To determine early and late respondents, the date of completing the 
questionnaire was used. The whole period was divided in two periods and the
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early and late respondents were identified. A  t test was used to test for any 
difference between early and late respondents on the likelihood of granting the 
credit scale. The results are shown in Table 4.1.
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TABLE 4.1
COMPARISON OF EARLY AND LATE RESPONDENTS
■BM sS iii ail
Group receiving the modified report and footnote
Early 70 2.35 1.52 0.18 -030 0.76
Late 68 2.43 1.43 0.17
Group receiving the unqualified report and footnote
Early 66 2.39 1.39 0.17 0.86 0.39
Late 69 2.20 1.17 0.14
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Based on the T values of -0.30 and 0.86 and the corresponding P values 
of 0.76 and 0.39, the null hypothesis of no difference between early and late 
respondents could not be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance. This 
conclusion held true for the group receiving the modified report and the 
footnote disclosure and the group receiving the unqualified report and the 
footnote disclosure. Therefore, if nonrespondents possessed the same 
characteristics as late respondents, the results of this study would not be 
significantly different.
Research Results
After determining that potential nonresponse bias should not 
significantly affect the survey’s results, the research investigated the different 
hypotheses. The group receiving the modified report and the footnote is 
referred to as "Group P & F." The group receiving the unqualified report and 
the footnote is referred to as "Group F."
Hypotheses Tests
The first hypothesis investigated whether the group receiving the 
modified report and the footnote would differ significantly in its likelihood of 
granting a line of credit from the group receiving the unqualified report and 
the footnote. This hypothesis was designed to measure risk perception, where 
the lower the likelihood of granting a line of credit, the higher the perception 
of risk. It is restated as follows:
I
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Hypothesis 1: Bankers’ estimate of the likelihood of granting a line of 
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a 
footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the estimate to the 
same company on the basis o f an unqualified opinion and a footnote 
disclosure.
A t test was employed to test this hypothesis and the results are shown 
in Table 4.2.
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COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ LENDING ESTIMATE




140 235 1.33 0.11 -0.38 0.69
Group 
P & F
141 2.42 1.47 0.12
where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote 
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
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The results revealed the following findings. First, for both groups, the 
mean likelihood of granting the line of credit was low. This meant that, in 
general, bankers were reluctant to recommend a line of credit to a company 
exhibiting going concern difficulty. Second, the difference between both groups 
was not statistically significant. Based on the T value of -0.38 and its 
corresponding P value of 0.69, the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
two groups in their lending estimate could not be rejected at the 0.05 level of 
significance. A sample of both groups’ comments on the reasons for their 
estimate is provided in Appendix C.
The second hypothesis investigated whether both groups were 
significantly different in their interest rate estimate. It is restated as follows:
Hypothesis 2: The interest rate that bankers would charge for a line of 
credit to a given company based upon a modified going concern report and a 
footnote disclosure would not differ substantially from the interest rate the 
bankers would charge to the same company on the basis of an unqualified 
opinion and a footnote disclosure.
This hypothesis was similar to the first in that it measured risk where 
the higher the interest rate to charge the company, the higher the perception 
of risk. The results of the t test for equality of means are shown in Table 4.3.
i i
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COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ INTEREST RATE ESTIMATE
(above prime rate)
Group 8BBI— III 111H I
Group
F
139 2.48 0.88 0.07 -0.17 0.86
Group 
P & F
141 2.50 1.01 0.08
where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote 
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
87
The results showed that the mean interest rate that would be charged to 
this company by both groups was about 2.5% above the prime rate. Based on 
the T value of -0.17 and its corresponding P value of 0.86, the null hypothesis 
of no difference between the two groups in their interest rate estimate could 
not be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.
The third hypothesis tested for any difference between the two groups in 
their level of confidence in their estimates. Confidence in the estimate was a 
measure of any side effects of the explanatory paragraph. Confidence 
measured the quality of the lending decision where less confidence indicated 
lower quality for the decision. The hypothesis is restated as follows:
Hypothesis 3: Bankers’ confidence in their lending estimate for a given 
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote 
disclosure would not differ substantially from their confidence for a line of 
credit to the same company on the basis of an unqualified opinion and a 
footnote disclosure.
The t test results are shown in Table 4.4.
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COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ CONFIDENCE 




139 5.86 1.28 0.10 0.92 0.35
Group 
P & F
141 5.72 1.25 0.10
where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote 
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
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The results showed that, in general, bankers felt confident in then- 
lending estimate for the line of credit. Even though the group that received 
the unqualified report and the footnote was slightly more confident in its 
lending estimate than the group that received the modified report and the 
footnote, the difference was not statistically significant. Based on the T  value 
of 0.92 and its corresponding P value of 0.35, the null hypothesis of no 
difference between the two groups in their confidence level could not be 
rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.
The fourth hypothesis tested for any difference in perception of 
bankruptcy between the two groups where a significantly higher estimate of 
bankruptcy by the group receiving the modified report and the footnote 
indicates information content attributable to the explanatory paragraph. It is 
restated as follows:
Hypothesis 4: Bankers’ perception of bankruptcy likelihood for a given 
company based upon a modified going concern report and a footnote 
disclosure would not differ substantially from their perception about the same 
company on the basis o f an unqualified opinion and a footnote disclosure.
The t test results are shown in Table 4.5.
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TABLE 4.5
COMPARISON OF BOTH GROUPS’ 
BANKRUPTCY PERCEPTION 




138 3.85 1.33 0.11 -0.99 0.31
Group 
P & F
139 4.01 1.31 0.11
where:
Group F = Group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote 
Group P & F = Group receiving the modified report and the footnote
t
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These results showed that, in general, bankers had a neutral estimate of 
the likelihood that this company would declare bankruptcy in the next 12 
months. In other words, in their view, the chance of bankruptcy was about 
equal to the chance of survival. Even though the group receiving the modified 
report and the footnote had a slightly higher perception of bankruptcy than the 
other group, this difference was not significant. Based on the T  value of -0.99 
and its corresponding P value of 0.31, the fourth hypothesis of no difference 
between the two groups in their perception of bankruptcy could not be rejected 
at the 0.05 level of significance.
Summary
The previous t-tests have investigated any difference between the group 
receiving the modified report and the footnote and the group receiving the 
unqualified report and the footnote. The results revealed that there was no 
statistical difference between these two groups on any of the scales or the 
interest rate estimate.
Ordinary Least Squares
In addition to the above statistical tests, OLS regression was used to 
investigate whether any of the demographic characteristics of lending officers 
or their banks had an impact on the estimates or the perceptions. In the first 
test, the likelihood of granting the line of credit estimate was the dependent
t
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variable and the different demographic characteristics were the independent 
variables. The results are revealed in Table 4.6.
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TABLE 4.6
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON THE LENDING ESTIMATE
(280 observations)
■ ■ ■
Interc. 2.08 6.32 0.0001 0.80 0.55
Parag 0.08 0.52 0.60
Exp 0.01 0.23 0.81
Acc 0.10 1.49 0.13
Audit 0.10 0.57 0.56
Asset -0.06 -1.03 0.30
where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph 
Exp = Loan officers’ experience
Acc = Loan officers’ accounting education
Audit = Loan officers’ audit education
Asset = Bank asset size
6
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Since there was no single explanatory variable that was statistically 
significantly different from zero at the 0.05 level, the null hypothesis that there 
was no relationship between the dependent variable and all of the suggested 
explanatory variables could not be rejected at the 0.05 level of significance.
This meant that none of the demographic characteristics of the bankers or the 
banks had an impact on the likelihood of granting the line of credit.
The results of examining the potential impact of these same 
demographic characteristics on the bankers’ estimate of the interest rate are 
shown in Table 4.7.
i
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TABLE 4.7
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 




Interc. 2.38 10.85 0.0001 2.13 0.06***
Parag 0.03 0.32 0.74
Exp 0.10 2.49 0.013**
Acc -0.05 -1.17 0.24
Audit 0.14 1.14 0.25
Asset -0.07 -1.70 0.08***
** significant at the 0.05 level *** significant at the .10 level
where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph 
Exp = Loan officers’ experience
Acc = Loan officers’ accounting education
Audit = Loan officers’ audit education
Asset = Bank asset size
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Among all the possible explanatory variables, experience as a loan 
officer attained statistical significance at the 0.05 level. With a positive 
coefficient estimate, this means that the more experience loan officers 
possessed, the higher the interest rate they would charge to a company. A 
possible explanation for this significance is that loan officers with more 
experience were better able to assess a company’s risk profile in a lending 
recommendation because of their past dealings with similar companies. For a 
going concern situation, this assessment led to a higher risk profile which in 
turn led to a higher interest rate. In addition, bank assets was also significant 
at the .10 level. In this case, the higher the bank’s assets, the lower the 
premium interest rate the bank would charge this company. A possible 
explanation is that larger banks, because of their standing in the industry, are 
better able to offer lower loan rates to risky customers than other smaller 
banks that can not afford this advantage to risky customers.
OLS regression was also used to measure the impact of the explanatory 
variables on bankers’ confidence in their lending recommendation. The results 
are shown in Table 4.8.
£
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TABLE 4.8
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON BANKERS’ CONFIDENCE
(279 observations)
■ ■ ■ ■ ■ i m i S i
Interc. 5.81 20.11 0.0001 1.10 0.29
Parag -0.15 -1.02 0.30
Exp -0.004 -0.08 0.93
Acc -0.01 -0.20 0.84
Audit 0.14 0.90 0.36
Asset 0.02 0.49 0.62
where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph
Exp = Loan officers’ experience
Acc = Loan officers’ accounting education
Audit = Loan officers’ audit education
Asset = Bank asset size
a
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These results indicated that none of the explanatory variables was 
statistically significant at the .05 level. The null hypothesis that there is no 
relationship between the confidence level and the explanatory variables can not 
be rejected at the .05 level.
Regression analysis was finally used to investigate the potential impact 
of demographics on bankruptcy estimates for this company. The results are 
shown in Table 4.9.
il
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TABLE 4.9
EFFECT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS
ON BANKRUPTCY ESTIMATE
(280 observations)
jjj|jjWj W M l
Interc. 4.11 13.17 0.0001 1.46 0.22
Parag 0.19 1.19 0.23
Exp i O o -1.81 0.07***
Acc -0.002 -0.04 0.97
Audit 0.16 0.93 0.35
Asset 0.01 0.20 0.84
*** significant at the .10 level
where:
Parag = The explanatory paragraph 
Exp = Loan officers’ experience
Acc = Loan officers’ accounting education
Audit = Loan officers’ audit education
Asset = Bank asset size
J
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Among the possible explanatory variables, only experience attained 
significance at the .10 level. With a negative coefficient, this meant that the 
higher the bankers’ experience, the lower their perception of bankruptcy. This 
could be attributed to the bankers' previous dealings with companies in similar 
financial situation that survived their troubled years.
The next step of the analysis involved investigating the relationship 
between the interest rate estimate and bankruptcy perception in both groups.
It would seem plausible that the higher the perception of a company’s 
bankruptcy, the higher its risk and therefore, the higher the interest rate that 
would be charged to such a company. OLS regression was used to investigate 
this relationship where the interest rate estimate was the dependent variable 
and bankruptcy perception and the explanatory paragraph were the 
independent variables. The results are shown in Table 4.10.
J
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TABLE 4.10
EFFECT OF BANKRUPTCY PERCEPTION 




Interc. 1.91 10.84 0.0001 6.77 0.0013*
Bankr. 0.15 3.68 0.0003*
Parag. -0.025 -0.23 0.81
* significant at the .01 level
where:
Bankr = Estimate of company’s bankruptcy scale
Parag = the explanatory paragraph (1 if received modified report, 0 
otherwise)
i
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These results indicated there was a statistically significant relationship 
between bankruptcy perception and the interest rate at the .01 level of 
significance. The higher the company’s bankruptcy perception, the higher the 
interest rate that bankers would charge to this company. The explanatory 
paragraph did not have a statistically significant impact on the interest rate.
Nonparametric Tests
The parametric tests employed assumed that the population of bankers 
was normally distributed. Nonparametric tests, on the other hand, do not 
require such a restrictive assumption. The Kolmogorov-Smimov (KS) two- 
sample test requires only that the samples be randomly selected and be 
mutually independent.
The KS test involved determining the maximum absolute difference 
between the two-samples cumulative distribution functions. This maximum 
difference was then compared to the tabulated difference.
The KS test of the hypothesis of no difference in the lending 
recommendation between the two groups showed that the calculated maximum 
difference was 0.05. If the significance level was set at 0.10 for a two-tailed 
test, the tabulated difference was 0.21. Since the calculated difference was less 
than the tabulated difference, the null hypothesis of no difference between the 
cumulative distribution functions of the two populations of bankers could not 
be rejected at the 0.10 level of significance.
i
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The KS test of the hypothesis of no difference between confidence levels 
of both groups of bankers produced a calculated difference of 0.12. If the 
significance level was set at 0.10 for a two-tailed test, the tabulated difference 
was 0.21. Because the calculated difference was less than the tabulated 
difference, the null hypothesis of no difference between the distribution 
functions of both populations of bankers in their confidence level could not be 
rejected at the 0.10 level of significance.
The KS test of the hypothesis of no difference between both groups in 
their bankruptcy estimate produced a calculated difference of 0.07. Setting the 
significance level at 0.10 for a two-tailed test, the tabulated difference was 0.21. 
Because the calculated difference was less than the tabulated difference, the 
null hypothesis of no difference between the two distribution functions of 
bankers in their bankruptcy estimate could not be rejected at the 0.10 level of 
significance.
Relaxing the assumption of a normally distributed population and 
assuming that the Likert scale was an ordinal scale, the non-parametric KS test 
failed to reject the first, third and fourth hypotheses set forth in Chapter 2.
The KS test is exact if the measurement scale is continuous and produces 
slightly conservative results if the scale is discrete. According to Conover 
(1980), this means that the tabulated difference with a discrete scale may be 
slightly less than the tabulated difference with a continuous scale. However, 
since all calculated values were substantially less than the tabulated values, the
i
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test results would still be valid and the three hypotheses still would not be 
rejected.
Summary
This chapter presented the data collection procedures, analysis and 
results. It began with a discussion of the purpose and the execution of the pilot 
study which was followed by the main study. The possibility of nonresponse 
bias was examined by comparing early and late respondents. Next, the chapter 
discussed hypotheses tests. Parametric and nonparametric tests were applied to 
the data. Each hypothesis was tested to reject it or fail to reject it. The results 
showed no difference between the two groups of bankers on any of the scales 
or the interest rate estimate. The results also showed that experience positively 
affected the interest rate estimate and that bank assets negatively affected the 
interest rate estimate. In addition, experience negatively affected the bankers' 
perception of this company’s bankruptcy. There was also a statistically 
significant positive relationship between interest rate estimate and bankruptcy 
estimate for the group receiving the unqualified report and the footnote and a 
significant positive relationship between these two estimates for the group 
receiving the modified report and the footnote. The following chapter 
discusses the study’s conclusions and the policy implications of its findings. It 
also notes the limitations and provides suggestions for future research.
t
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
OF FINDINGS
This chapter discusses the research’s findings. It compares these results 
to previous empirical results in terms of agreement or disagreement. The 
chapter also discusses the implications of these findings on policy making in the 
auditing and banking professions. In addition, it notes the limitations of this 
research which should be considered when interpreting its results or drawing 
conclusions. Finally, it offers possible avenues for future research that would 
allow drawing more concrete conclusions on the impact of the going concern 
opinion on different users of the financial statements.
Discussion of Findings
This research had several major and secondary objectives. The major 
general objective was to investigate the impact of the going concern modified 
audit report on credit granting decisions by commercial loan officers. This 
general objective was achieved by searching for any information content 
attributable to the explanatory paragraph. Information content was determined 
to exist if two groups of bankers reached different conclusions about a
105
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particular company based on a modified audit report with an explanatory 
paragraph and footnote disclosure of the going concern uncertainty compared 
to an unqualified opinion and the footnote disclosure. Bankers had to estimate 
the likelihood that a line of credit would be granted, their confidence in this 
estimate, the interest rate to charge this company on the line of credit, and 
their perception of this company’s bankruptcy status. These estimates and 
perceptions served as means of detecting any information content of the 
explanatory paragraph.
Secondary objectives of this study included gaining insight into lenders’ 
reaction to a company exhibiting going concern difficulty. For example, were 
demographic characteristics such as experience, accounting and audit education 
and bank asset size significant determinants of any of the estimates or 
perceptions? These possible determinants could have implications to companies 
exhibiting going concern difficulties in their search for a loan. The following 
sections discuss the findings.
Likelihood of Granting 
Credit
It was hypothesized that the two groups of bankers would make the 
same estimate of granting a line of credit for this company regardless of the 
method of reporting going concern uncertainty. The results did not support a 
rejection of this hypothesis. Therefore, reporting going concern doubt in the
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audit report does not appear to influence bankers’ decision and does not have 
statistically significant information content.
This conclusion was reinforced by examining bankers’ reasons for their 
estimate (See Appendix C). Among all the factors cited, the most common 
factors for both groups were negative working capital, the company’s 
dependence on one customer and the company’s earnings history. These 
factors were listed in the explanatory paragraph. However, the fact that these 
items were noted by the bankers who received only the footnote disclosure 
indicates that the going concern footnote provides sufficient explanation of the 
going concern problem. For the group receiving the modified report and the 
footnote it appeared that of the 141 responses received, only 15 bankers noted 
the modified report as a factor in their lending estimate, reinforcing the same 
conclusion. In fact, some even wrote "going concern qualification", incorrectly 
referring to the modified report, an act that indicated that they did not 
perceive the opinion as an unqualified opinion.
These results agreed with the CAR’s (1978) conclusions that restating 
footnote information in the audit report was at best redundant and did not 
serve a useful purpose. The results also agreed with the ASB’s own logic in 
issuing SAS NO. 79 related to other uncertainties. From an academic point of 
view, they agreed with the following studies: Estes and Reimer (1977), Libby 
(1979b), Abdel-Khalik, Graul and Newton (1986) and Pringle, Crum and Swetz 
(1990). However, these results disagreed with Bamber and Stratton (1997) who
*1
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found information content attributable to the modified report due to other 
uncertainties and the other studies conducted outside the U.S.
In addition to finding no information content in the explanatory 
paragraph, it was noted that the likelihood of granting credit to a going concern 
company was low. Based on the Likert scale used in this study, granting a line 
of credit was very unlikely. This result agreed with LaSalle and Anandarajan 
(1997) who found that bankers were unwilling to consider a loan to companies 
with going concern problems.
Interest Rate Estimate
The interest rate estimate also served to measure risk. It was 
hypothesized that both groups of bankers would be similar in their interest rate 
determination. The results did not support a rejection of this hypothesis. It 
was found that bankers assigned the same rate (approximately 2.5% above the 
prime rate) to the company regardless of the method of reporting going 
concern uncertainty. The explanatory paragraph, therefore, appears to have no 
information content. This result agreed with Libby (1979b) and Abdel-Khalik, 
Graul and Newton (1986). These studies also did not find an interest rate 
difference in loans which bankers would grant to companies based on a 
qualified opinion with a footnote and only a footnote disclosure. The results 
disagreed with Bamber and Stratton (1997) who found a significant interest 
rate difference due to a modified report for other uncertainties. The results 
also disagreed with Gul’s (1987) results in Singapore.
k
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Confidence in Lending Estimate
It was hypothesized that bankers’ confidence in a lending estimate would 
not differ significantly based on the method of reporting going concern 
uncertainty. This hypothesis was designed to measure the quality of the 
lending decision. The results did not support a rejection of this hypothesis. 
Based on the Likert scale, bankers were on average very confident in their 
lending decision. These two estimates, the unlikelihood of making a loan and 
their confidence in that decision, taken together reinforced LaSalle and 
Anandarajan’s (1997) study that bankers were reluctant to offer credit to a 
company with going concern uncertainty. The results also did not reveal 
confusion due to the explanatory paragraph in an unqualified opinion as noted 
by Pringle, Crum, and Swetz (1990).
Bankruptcy Prediction
It was hypothesized that bankruptcy perception for the same company 
would be similar regardless of the reporting method. The results did not 
support a rejection of this hypothesis. Both groups of bankers assessed the 
same bankruptcy likelihood to this company. Even though the explanatory 
paragraph, apparently, did not have information content, other results 
appeared. Surprisingly, bankers viewed the likelihood of bankruptcy as 
neutral. On a Likert scale, this meant the company was as likely to declare 
bankruptcy as to survive. In its recommendation to eliminate the going 
concern modification, the CAR (1978) noted that users viewed these
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modifications as prediction of bankruptcy. This study did not find that 
particular effect.
Demographic Characteristics
This study found that experience as a loan officer had a significant 
positive impact on the interest rate to charge a company exhibiting going 
concern difficulty. This finding agreed with Keyes (1978) and Rodgers and 
Housel’s (1987) studies that found demographic characteristics to be significant 
in the loan decision. In addition, larger banks would have charged a lower 
interest rate premium to this company compared to smaller banks. This could 
be attributed to larger banks settling for a lower return on their investment 
while smaller banks, being more risk averse, would require a larger return on 
their investment. Experience also negatively affected bankruptcy estimates, 
possibly due to past dealings with similar troubled companies that eventually 
survived.
Implications of Findings
This study investigated the information content of the going concern 
explanatory paragraph in the modified audit report. The ASB requires the 
auditor to positively assess going concern uncertainty in every audit and, if 
doubt exists, to add an explanatory paragraph to the audit report. However, 
previous research by different committees, as well as academic research, often 
has concluded that the information contained in the paragraph is redundant.
i
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The current study confirmed these conclusions. When faced with a double 
signal regarding going concern uncertainty (explanatory paragraph and 
footnote), bankers did not behave differently than when faced with only one 
signal in the footnote.
This study’s results should be useful to the ASB in its policy making 
efforts. Even though adequate and appropriate disclosure is in the best interest 
of all users, redundant information should be avoided. The ASB took the 
correct step in eliminating the explanatory paragraph requirement for other 
uncertainties and should seriously consider doing the same for going concern 
uncertainty.
Limitations of the Study
The conclusions of this study should be interpreted with the following 
limitations, that may or may not affect the generalizability of the results. First, 
even though the study’s response rate of 13% was adequate for the statistical 
tests employed, and nonresponse bias was not detected, the possibility always 
exists that nonrespondents could have provided different answers that would 
have changed the result. This limitation, however, is common to all surveys.
Second, bankers receiving the modified report and the footnote 
disclosure of going concern uncertainty were faced with the standard reporting 
practice for this situation, a practice with which they were familiar. However, 
the other group received an unqualified audit report with no reference to going 
concern uncertainty and a footnote disclosure, a reporting practice with which
i
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they were not familiar. The artificial nature of this situation should be taken 
into consideration in interpreting the results.
Finally, the study’s conclusions may or may not be generalized to other 
companies exhibiting going concern uncertainty. Care was taken to choose a 
company exhibiting borderline going concern characteristics to avoid extreme 
answers. Based on respondents’ bankruptcy estimate, this proved to be true. 
However, bankers’ reaction to other companies with more or less severe going 
concern characteristics may be different.
Suggestions for Future Research
Reporting going concern difficulty has been a controversial issue for the 
ASB, auditors and users. This study investigated bankers’ reaction to the 
current method of reporting compared to a method not currently used. Future 
research could address two important issues. First, it should investigate other 
users’ (such as bondholders, stockholders and financial analysts) reaction to the 
going concern explanatory paragraph. If the same results were found, it would 
strengthen the argument of eliminating the going concern modification in the 
audit report. Second, since SAS No. 59 was issued in 1988, it is important to 
measure users’ preference for the method of reporting going concern 
uncertainty ten years later. Therefore, a descriptive study could be conducted, 
especially since the report modification requirement for other uncertainties was 
eliminated by the issuance of SAS No. 79 in 1995.
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CASE STUDY AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Audit report contains the explanatoiy paragraph)
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The leading decision is a continuing concern for members of the 
banking community, the accounting profession, and academia. Questions have 
arisen concerning the amount and type of information communicated to users 
of the financial statements, especially bankers.
I am a doctoral candidate in accounting at Louisiana Tech University 
and am conducting a study to determine a company’s risk profile in a lending 
decision. This risk will be measured based on loan officers’ reaction to 
selected information included in this company’s annual report.
You have probably been asked in the past to participate in studies 
concerning corporate financial reporting. These requests can become 
burdensome; yet only through the help of experts like yourself can the quality 
of this information be improved. If you feel that somebody else in your bank 
may be more interested in completing this survey, please forward it to him/her.
Please find enclosed selected information from a company’s annual 
report to use in a lending decision. Obviously, corporate lending decisions are 
based on a  great deal of information beyond that provided here for this 
company. However, it was necessary that the information package be limited 
to that enclosed due to your time constraints. May I ask 10-20 minutes of your 
time to review the enclosed information and answer a few questions? You can 
be assured of complete confidentiality. Your bank’s name will never be placed 
on the research instrument nor will any respondent be individually identified. 
Your help will be sincerely appreciated and will hopefully contribute to 
improvements in financial reporting.
Sincerely,
Rafik Z. Elias
DBA Candidate in Accounting
I
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The data provided consists of:
(1) Information about the company and its business
(2) An audit report
(3) Condensed financial statements
(4) 3 Footnotes
After reading this information, the questions will ask you to predict the 
likelihood that this company will be granted a one-year secured working capital 
line of credit in the range of $750,000 - $1 million and the appropriate interest 
rate.
DESCRIPTION OF BUSINESS
Started in 1976, ABC, Inc. is engaged through its wholly owned 
subsidiary, Sub., Inc. in manufacturing and distributing cosmetics and other 
beauty products and providing facial and other beauty services. Products and 
services are sold in better department stores and specialty stores in the U.S. 
and Canada. In 1995, Sub., began selling specialty cosmetic products through 
television marketing.
OTHER INFORMATION
Number of outstanding shares: 11,612,926
Shares held by officers and directors: 8,188,935 (70% of total)
Number of shareholders: 2,519
Close(or average) price for the stock: $1,375
Exchange: American Stock Exchange
Market value(OOOs): $15,909
Annual dividends: 0
Number of employees: 118
il
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3-YEAR FINANCIAL SUMMARY(OOO'S)
July 31,1996 July 31,1995 July 31,1994
Cash 516 10 1,134
Receivables 1,392 2,689 1,444
Inventories 3,327 2,553 3,766
Other Current Assets 29 282 268
TOTAL CURRENT ASSETS 5,264 5,535 6,611
Property, Plant & Equipment 7,351 7,949 8,182
Accumulated Depredation 5,622 5,093 4,342
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 1,729 2,856 3,840
Intangibles 3,625 3,795 3,965
Deposits & Other Assets 138 176 198
TOTAL ASSETS 10,756 12.362 14.615
Accounts Payable 3,106 . 3,789 3,343
Current Long-Term Debt 2,863 5.421 7.641
Accrued Expenses 1,924 2,230 2,461
TOTAL CURRENT LIABILITIES 7,893 11,440 13,445
Long-Term Debt 725 149 149
Other Long-Term Liabilities 120
TOTAL LIABILITIES 8,618 11,589 13,714
Common StockfNet) 115 114 103
Preferred Stock 750 750 750
Capital Surplus 12,630 12,522 11,234
Retained Earnings (11.357) (1Z613) (11.186)
TOTAL STOCKHOLDERS’ EQUITY 2.138 774 901
TOTAL LIABILITIES & EQUITY 10.756 12,36? 14.615
Net Sales 32,151 29,358 34,764
Cost Of Goods Sold 9,292 7,651 13,035
GROSS PROFIT 22,859 21,707 21,729
Selling, General & Administrative Expenses 20,899 22,631 29,284
OPERATING INCOMEfLOSS) 1,960 (924) (7,554)
Interest Expenses 440 461 1,508
Other Expenses 21 42 677
Income Before Taxes 1,499 (1.427) (6,723)
NET INCOMEfLOSS) 1.365 (1.427) L«,723)
Shares Outstanding 11,519 11,403 10,272
Net Income 1,365 (1,427) (6.722)
Depredation/Amortization 1,491 1,136 1,001
Net Increase/Decrease Assets/Liabilities (174) 69 5,829
Other AdjustmentsfNet) 192 212 (1.754)
NET CASH PROVIDED(USED) BY OPERATING ACT1V 2,874 (10) (1.646)
Net lncrease(Deaease) in Property, Plant & Equipment (387) (193) (81)
Acquisrtion(disposib'on) of subs, business 1799
NET CASH PROVfDED(USED) BY INVESTING ACTIVt (387) (193) 1,718
lncrease(Decrease) in Borrowings (1.981) (1.957) (2.327)
tssue(Purchasa) of Equity 3,300
Other Cash Inflow 1,036
NET CASH PROVIDED(USED) BY FINANCING ACTIVt (1.981) (921) 973
NET CHANGE IN CASH AND CASH EQUIVALENTS 506 11.1241 1.045
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AUDIT REPORT BY A "BIG SIX" FIRM
We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of ABC, 
Inc.(a New York corporation) and subsidiaries as of July 31, 1996 and 1995, 
and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders’ equity and 
cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996. These 
financial statements are the responsibility of the company’s management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on 
our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit 
also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates 
made my management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement 
presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, 
in all material respects the financial position of ABC, Inc. and subsidiaries as 
of July 31, 1996 and 1995, and the results of their operations and their cash 
flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996, in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
The accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming 
that the company will continue as a going concern. As discussed in Note 3 to 
the financial statements, the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996 is the first 
profitable year of operations in five years; however, the company maintains a 
working capital deficit at July 31, 1996 and is significantly dependent upon one 
customer. These factors discussed in Note 3 raise substantial doubt about the 
company’s ability to continue as a going concern. Management’s plans in regard 
to these matters are also described in Note 3. The financial statements do not 
include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of this uncertainty.
i
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FOOTNOTES TO THE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
NOTE 1: SIGNIFICANT ACCOUNTING POLICIES:
All significant intercompany transactions and accounts have been 
eliminated in consolidation. Inventories are stated at the lower of cost or 
market. Cost is determined using the first-in, first-out method. Property, plant 
and equipment are stated at cost and depreciated using the straight-line 
method over their estimated useful lives ranging from 4 to 15 years.
NOTE 2: DEBTS OUTSTANDING: 
LONG-TERM DEBT:
1996 1995
Term promissory note $1,025,000 $1,325,000
(please see (1) below)
Term loan 2,500,00 3,741,233
(please see (2) below)
Related party loans 34,826 300,000
Notes payable(construction) 28,019 202,993
3,587,845 5,569,226
Less, current portion (2,862,845) (5,420,644)
Long-term notes payable 725,000 148,582
(1) Note is collaterized by a distribution and administration facility. Interest is 
2% above the bank’s prime lending rate(8.75% and 7.25% at July 31, 1996 and 
1995 respectively). Principal payments of $25,000 are due each month until 
Dec. 1999.
(2) Interest is .5% above the bank’s prime lending rate. Financial covenants at 
July 31, 1996 require the company to have consolidated tangible net worth of 
not less than $2,250,000 and capital expenditures not to exceed $400,000. The
i
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company was in compliance. For the year ending July 31, 1997, consolidated 
net worth should be no less than $1 million.
NOTE 3; GOING CONCERN;
During the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996, the company began to realize 
the results of its restructuring efforts which have been occurring over the last 
three fiscal years. Over this period of time, the company reduced staff levels, 
implemented cost reduction programs and was successful in restructuring its 
debt facilities into longer more manageable terms. These factors combined with 
the success of the sales of Sub. products through the Home Shopping 
Network(HSN) has resulted in the company recording profits of $1,364,646 for 
the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996. This is the first profitable year for the 
company since the fiscal year ended July 1990. However, the company still 
maintains negative working capital of $2,629,154 and is currently significantly 
dependent upon one customer, and must meet a tangible net worth covenant of 
$1 million by July 31, 1997. During the fiscal year ended July 31, 1996 HSN 
was responsible for 48% of net sales. The prior years’ losses combined with the 
demands of reducing large debt levels limited the company’s ability to provide 
inventory to its customers, in adequate supply, on a consistent basis.
The current year’s profitability and positive cash flow from operations 
have enabled the company to minimize its out-of-stock inventory situation. 
During the latter part of fiscal year 1996, the company also decided to suspend 
its distribution of fragrance products. The company can now concentrate its 
efforts and available cash flow toward attaining inventory levels in the skin care 
and cosmetic products distributed by Sub. which are more closely matched with 
manufacturing lead times and customer demands. During fiscal 1997, the 
company plans to invest in the refixturing and updating of its facial salons and 
counters at department store locations. The fiscal 1996 selling, general and 
administrative expenses include a $500,000 charge which reflects the 
acceleration of depreciation on older outdated salon equipment, furniture and 
fixtures. There has been increased interest in the Sub. product line due to the 
success of the sale of products through HSN. In addition to being able to 
provide the customer with a full line of skin care products, the company wants 
to maintain and enhance its image as a provider of quality skin care services. 
The company is seeking a buyer for the Y Trademark and investigating 
opportunities to sell and distribute the Sub. product line outside of its current 
U.S. and Canadian markets.
i
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QUESTIONNAIRE
Please answer the following questions. Your help is greatly appreciated.
Assume that this company is a new customer applying to your bank for a one- 
year working capital line of credit in the range of $750,000 - $1 million. It will 
be secured by the company’s accounts receivable and inventory.
1. Based on the information presented in this case, please estimate the 
likelihood, on a scale of 1 to 7, that this line of credit will be granted, (circle 
one)
2. What were the major factors influencing the decision relative to the granting 
of this line of credit?
3. On a scale of 1 to 7, please indicate your level of confidence in your 
previous estimate.(circle one)
3. Regardless of the previous answers, please indicate your best estimate of the 
interest rate to charge this company on this line of credit, assuming that your 
bank uses the Wall Street Journal published prime rate and that it is currently
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4. On a scale of 1 to 7, please indicate your best estimate that this company 
will be bankrupt in the next 12 months, (circle one)
1------ 2------ 3-------4------ 5-------6-------7
(highly (highly
unlikely) likely)
5. Approximately, how many years of lending experience do you 
have?(including experience in reviewing loan applications) (check one)
 less than 5  5-10  11-15
16-20 more than 20
6. Approximately, how many university-level accounting courses have you 
taken?(check one)
 less than 2  2-3  4-5
6-7 more than 7
7. Have you had at least one auditing course? Yes  No
8. Please indicate the appropriate range of your bank’s assets:
__________$100 - $299.9 Million
$300 - $499.9 Million
__________$500 - $999.9 Million
__________$1-4.9  Billion
__________$5 Billion Pius
9. Please write today’s date
Please detach the two pages containing the questions and mail them back in 
the enclosed envelope. If you would like to receive a copy of this study’s results, 
please enclose your name and address on a separate sheet of paper or a 
business card in the envelope.
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
i
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CASE STUDY AND QUESTIONNAIRE SAME AS APPENDIX A 
(Audit report without the explanatory paragraph)
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We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets of ABC, 
Inc.(a New York corporation) and subsidiaries as of July 31, 1996 and 1995, 
and the related consolidated statements of operations, shareholders’ equity and 
cash flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996. These 
financial statements are the responsibility of the company’s management. Our 
responsibility is to express an opinion on these financial statements based on 
our audits.
We conducted our audits in accordance with generally accepted auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 
obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free of 
material misstatement. An audit includes examining, on a test basis, evidence 
supporting the amounts and disclosures in the financial statements. An audit 
also includes assessing the accounting principles used and significant estimates 
made my management, as well as evaluating the overall financial statement 
presentation. We believe that our audits provide a reasonable basis for our 
opinion.
In our opinion, the financial statements referred to above present fairly, 
in all material respects the financial position of ABC, Inc. and subsidiaries as 
of July 31, 1996 and 1995, and the results of their operations and their cash 
flows for each of the three years in the period ended July 31, 1996, in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles.
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RESPONSES FROM THE GROUP RECEIVING THE MODIFIED
REPORT AND THE FOOTNOTE DISCLOSURE
Positive Factors
1. Profitable operations this year
2. New avenues for growth-Television Marketing
3. Focusing on best product seller
Negative Factors
1. Poor earnings performance
2. Highly leveraged
3. Undercapitalized
4. Dependent on one customer
5. Going concern qualification
6. Only one year of profitability
7. Negative working capital
8. Need to see results of other changes in operations
i
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RESPONSES FROM THE GROUP RECEIVING
ONLY THE FOOTNOTE DISCLOSURE
Positive Factors
1. Current liabilities and total liabilities are decreasing
2. Gross profit and net income are increasing
3. Steps are being taken to turn the company around and improve financial 
health
Negative Factors
1. Only one year of profitability
2. Weak liquidity
3. Collateral is inventory dependent
4. Sales dependent on one customer
5. Negative net worth
6. Highly leveraged
7. High operating expenses(mismanagement)
8. Negative cash flows after debt amortization
9. High intangible assets
10. Unstable market, likelihood of low quality accounts receivable
11. Negative working capital
i
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